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Empowerment and Public Service Delivery in Developing Asia and the Pacific
Viewed as a key to strengthening accountability, citizen empowerment alone is not enough 
to guarantee quality public service. It must go hand in hand with better governance. This 
report highlights two factors that have improved governance and public service provision 
in developing Asia: (i) citizen participation and monitoring of service providers, and 
(ii) the use of information and communication technology (ICT) to streamline bureaucratic 
processes, widen access to information, and embolden people’s voice. Participation and 
ICT hold great promises for the future, and yet require increasing public sector role as a 
facilitator—not so much as a provider—in public service delivery chain. 
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Foreword
I feel very privileged to be associated with this report, which will be presented at the Annual Meeting of the Board 
of Governors of the Asian Development Bank in New Delhi in May 2013. The general theme of this meeting is 
“Development through Empowerment,” and the report makes a fine contribution toward an understanding of that 
path to development. The particular subject matter of this study, ably led by Shikha Jha and Anil Deolalikar, is 
the critical importance of essential services in helping the expansion of human well-being and the reduction of 
poverty and deprivation, and the part that empowerment of the people can play in facilitating this process. It also 
discusses the distinct ways in which empowerment of people can be advanced and the kind of results we should 
expect to see as a result of these constructive changes.
The report is self-contained, with a good statement of the questions asked and the conclusions reached, 
and it is not necessary for me to re-state here what the authors have discussed very well in the body of the text. 
However, there is a case for placing the report in a wider perspective. In understanding the background to this 
enquiry, it is important to appreciate (i) the nature and richness of the idea of empowerment, (ii) the direct and 
indirect roles of essential services in promoting human empowerment, and (iii) the respective roles of the state 
and the market in development through empowerment.
 Empowerment is integrally related to the expansion of human freedom—the freedom of people, often very 
disadvantaged people, to be able to do and achieve what they want (and have reason to want). Empowerment 
can, thus, be seen as enhancement of human capability. But it concerns particularly those capabilities that give 
a person an ability to catch up with others, and in particular, not be dominated by people in more privileged 
positions, because of wealth, social standing, or political entitlement.
Consider Aneurin Bevan’s famous comment, “The purpose of getting power is to be able to give it away,” 
which Michael Foot separated out for special attention in his biography of Bevan. The remark may initially appear 
to be mysterious, but it is an eloquent articulation of the fact that the underdogs of society may seek power not 
so much to use it over others, but to make sure that others do not have power over them. To have power without 
using it is quite different from not having that power at all. This idea fits generally with the capability perspective, 
which points to the importance of having the freedom to do something one has reason to value (whether or not 
one actually chooses to do it). And yet the idea of empowerment goes beyond that. The language of power can 
be very effective in drawing attention to the conflicting aspects of interdependences involved in social, economic, 
and political relations. For example, having the power to make public authorities, or private businesses, pay 
attention to the concerns of the underdogs of society is a quintessential example of significant empowerment. 
And on this subject (among others), the report has much insight to offer.
Empowerment has importance of its own in advancing human freedom and well-being, but it also helps 
in the consolidation, advancement, and improvement of essential services, which in turn expand human well-
being and freedom. This report is much concerned with these linkages. The contribution of empowerment to the 
successes of development works indirectly as well as directly. An extensive expansion of the capabilities and 
freedoms of people (especially less privileged people), and the corresponding enhancement of their powers, are 
part and parcel of the development process, and there is no need to look for indirect connections in acknowledging 
the importance of this basic recognition. The ability of people to lead a long and fulfilling life, to be educated and 
numerate, to avoid suffering from disease and from uncared old age, and other such fundamentally important 
freedoms must, with good reason, be seen to be constitutive parts of human development.
 While those direct connections are easy to appreciate, there are also more complicated relations in 
understanding the different ways in which human empowerment can also contribute to expanding the delivery 
and use of essential services, like schooling, medical care, social amenities (such as sanitation, water supply, 
and, of course, environmental preservation). There is a two-way relationship here. To illustrate, just as schooling 
and medical care contribute to empowering people, people with clearer understanding and articulate voices, and 
strengthened by good social organization can demand with energy and force more—and better—public services. 
There can be many indirect connections in enhancing people’s power to make strong demand for more facilities, 
and to insist on good quality of the services offered. And empowerment may reflect itself also in arrangements 
for monitoring what is offered to the people.
These diverse—but interrelated—connections are particularly worth investigating, both because of their 
importance and because of their complexity. This report has a great deal to say on these connections: how they 
work, and what can be done to enhance their vigor and reach.
The third issue concerns the role of the market in providing many of these services, when they can be 
incorporated within a profit-seeking framework. However, sometimes this becomes difficult to do, because 
of barriers to successful marketization, which economists have studied for a long time, involving absence 
of competition, presence of “externalities,” the importance of indivisible “public goods,” and asymmetric 
information affecting the relations between buyers and sellers. The motivations of private firms, seeking profits in 
an aggressive way (e.g., the steps taken by health insurance companies to exclude patients with previous records 
of serious illnesses or proneness to particular ailments) can also clash fairly comprehensively with fair and just 
provision of services (in this case of medical services).
There are further issues of instrumental use of markets, even when the planning and support for the 
services come from the state. The state can deliver some services directly, and often has reason to do so, but in 
other cases the process of state support for these services (e.g., for schooling or medical care) can make use, 
to varying extents, of the market mechanism. For example, in providing nutritional support, the state can either 
provide food to people in kind, or provide income support to the poorer people, leaving them to buy food from 
the market, with the help of their enhanced cash position. Similarly, alternatives to state-run schools include self-
reliant private schools, or private schools that are made to accommodate a certain proportion of non-fee-paying 
pupils, or a proportion of pupils who have publicly-given vouchers that they can use to go to one private school 
or another.
There is, thus, a large cluster of difficult choices that have to be faced and addressed in deciding on 
the right public–private mixture in the provision of essential services, including important issues of efficiency 
and equity. The report has probingly investigated many of these decisional problems. The choices link very 
extensively with the role of empowerment of people in making these services available and effectively usable. 
The terrain of development strategy studied in this report is quite central to the approach of development through 
empowerment. We have excellent reason to be grateful to the authors of this far-reaching and enlightening report.
 
 Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen
 Thomas W. Lamont University Professor
 and Professor of  Economics and Philosophy 
 Harvard University
Preface
The delivery of high-quality public services is an essential element of inclusive development. A public services 
system providing essential food, health services, and medical care to vulnerable sections of the population can 
bring the essentials of livelihood within easy reach of people whose lives may remain otherwise untouched by 
income growth.
Developing Asia has seen impressive economic growth in recent decades. This has expanded the resources 
available for publicly provisioned services, bringing significant progress in improving social outcomes, particularly 
in education and health. However, the expansion and quality of public services in the region has seriously lagged 
behind the pace of growth. The region simply has to do better in delivering essential public services if it wishes 
to continue improving the quality of life for millions of its people.
This study on how citizens’ voice and empowerment can improve the delivery of public services by increasing 
the accountability of the state is the first regional report on empowerment and inclusive development. It provides 
important analysis for policy makers, businesses, academics, and civil society, as it shows how the quantity and 
quality of public services in a country can be improved, if the government actively solicits citizen participation and 
citizen feedback in service delivery. 
Equally important is the caveat that citizen empowerment alone is not enough to guarantee quality public 
services. Empowerment must go hand in hand with changes in governance and changes in the way public 
institutions, such as the bureaucracy, judiciary, and frontline providers, view clients and go about their day-to-day 
business. Naturally, this is a much more difficult task, but a critical one going forward.
The study highlights two factors that have improved governance and service delivery in the region: 
(i) partnerships among governments, private groups, and nongovernment organizations in delivering basic 
services, and (ii) the use of information and communication technology (ICT) to streamline bureaucratic 
processes, deliver public services, and empower people through better access to information and voice creation. 
Partnerships and ICT in developing Asia have expanded considerably in the last decade and hold great promise 
for the future. Both require greater involvement and engagement by the public sector in public service delivery—
not necessarily as a provider but increasingly as a facilitator.
I congratulate the authors of the study and look forward to the role the region will play in empowering 
citizens and communities for more and better public services in the future.
 
 Bindu Lohani
 Vice-President 
 Knowledge Management and Sustainable Development
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Highlights
This policy report examines the role of peoples’ empowerment in improving the quantity and quality of public 
services. The basic foundation of the report is Amartya Sen’s influential work on freedom, participation and 
agency—his approach to empowerment as the process of enlarging a person’s “functionings and capabilities to 
function, the range of things that a person could do and be in her life” (Sen 1999:75). 
Economic Development and Public Services in Asia: Persistent Challenges
Despite the remarkable progress in poverty reduction and achievement of several Millennium Development 
Goal (MDG) targets in developing Asia, the lives of many of the poor remain untouched. Indeed, the astounding 
progress made is matched by persistent hunger, high poverty rates, increased inequality, gender imbalances, 
and lack of decent employment opportunities for a large number of the poor—left behind by rapid economic 
growth in many countries across the region.  
Many Asian governments provide essential public services—education and medical services, for example—
for citizens to lead better lives and benefit from economic progress. While public services have improved 
considerably, the level of services provided remains low, with the quality of services and access to services by 
the poor varying widely across countries.
Where large-scale provisions of education, health care, drinking water, and sanitation services occur, there 
is significant progress in social outcomes. The remarkable increase in access to primary schooling has led to 
substantial gains in the average number of years of schooling and near-universal net primary enrollment rates. 
The notable rise in life expectancy and fall in under-5 mortality rates are hallmarks of Asia’s overall advance in 
health outcomes. 
However, the exceptional achievements in aggregate social developments in the region are masked by 
uneven gains at the country level. Results in several individual countries leave much to be desired. Unequal 
access of the poor to public services in many countries means that the benefits largely accrue to those who are 
better off, thus perpetuating disparities in distribution. The quality of services suffers from teacher and health 
worker absenteeism in government schools and public clinics. 
Lack of transparency and weak governance encourages corruption, rent seeking by public service providers, 
and misappropriation of public funds meant for service delivery. Private sector providers find it difficult to start a 
business, enforce a contract, get electricity connections, and resolve insolvency. The impact of poor governance 
varies across services. Some countries are particularly prone to poor regulatory quality and other governance 
issues. 
Empowering Citizens for Better Service Delivery
The concept of empowerment used in this report follows Amartya Sen’s rights, entitlements, and capability 
approach, emphasizing the freedom of choice, capability, and opportunity. Empowered people should be free to 
choose what they want to do, have the functional ability to put those choices into action, and have an enabling 
environment that allows them to actually perform those actions. 
Access to food, safe drinking water and sanitation, and communicable disease control are vital for citizens 
and communities to function well. Schools as well as early childhood and literacy programs enhance human 
capital. These are essential ingredients to build empowerment. 
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Many Asian economies have adopted a rights-based approach to specific social services and basic 
necessities, as well as the right to information. Rights to health, education, clean water, and social protection are 
widely prevalent across the region. Rights-based citizen entitlements are legally enforceable with specific roles 
and responsibilities for implementing authorities and criteria established to identify eligible beneficiaries. 
Though backed by legal or constitutional provisions, these rights in practice are difficult to enforce 
in developing countries. Limited fiscal resources pose the biggest challenge in implementing a rights-based 
approach, especially in low-income countries. Furthermore, those better off take advantage of legalized rights 
more often than the poor. In Brazil and India, for example, litigation cases are concentrated more in affluent than 
poor areas, and on tertiary than primary education. 
Community participation in service delivery makes the users aware of necessary minimum levels of public 
services to function well, and gives them voice. The capacity for collective action empowers citizens to improve 
social accountability. There has been extensive and growing use of participatory development in many developing 
countries.
Citizens’ participatory monitoring of service providers allows for direct accountability. Participatory 
monitoring and evaluation tools—such as citizen report cards, community score cards, social audits, and grievance 
redress systems—work best with transparent dissemination of information. Social accountability mechanisms 
effectively expose corruption, increase awareness of entitlements, empower people to claim their rights, and 
facilitate citizen engagement in the service delivery process.
However, citizen empowerment can only improve the quality of public services if there are complementary 
reforms in public management. These reforms encompass the bureaucracy, the political process, the judiciary, 
and frontline service providers. Even though some Asian countries have improved governance structures, there 
needs to be a systemic reform within many bureaucracies to create a genuinely transparent and accountable 
mode for good governance.
Public Service Provision through Public–Private Partnerships
Governments can improve access to and the quality of public services by leveraging or partnering with the private 
sector and nongovernment organizations (NGOs) in service delivery. The use of public–private partnerships 
(PPPs) has expanded in recent years in developing Asia to reduce the risks and responsibilities of the state, lower 
fiscal costs, and extend access to quality public services.
Greater involvement and proliferation of partnerships with non-state entities in providing services requires 
more effective state regulation. As household incomes rise, there is a growing preference for non-state providers, 
usually seen as offering better services. The shift in government role from service provider to service facilitator 
must be accompanied by stronger state regulation and controls for ensuring accountability.
The Double-Edged Impact of Information and Communication Technology 
on Empowerment and Service Quality
Information and communication technology (ICT) has proven to be a powerful tool for improving both the demand 
and supply sides of public services. It can empower people through easy access to better information on the 
performance of service providers, making it easier for citizens to monitor performance.
Great improvement in a government’s internal efficiency is possible through modern technology, 
e-governance, improved transparency, and expedited service provision. 
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Most successful ICT interventions that improve public service delivery are implemented through partnerships 
among several public and private agencies. 
Policy Priorities for Developing Asia
Essential public services to protect the poor and vulnerable groups and promote inclusive development are the 
government’s responsibility. When markets do not exist or are inadequate, private providers have an incentive 
to cut corners in providing public services. Under these circumstances, efficient public service delivery requires 
state involvement as a financier or provider. 
Governments should actively solicit citizen participation and citizen feedback—more generally empowering 
citizens and communities—in matters related to service delivery. There is considerable evidence from developing 
Asia and the Pacific to suggest that citizen and community empowerment mechanisms—including rights-based 
entitlements, participatory performance management, and community participation in service delivery—increase 
accountability of the government and public providers to citizens, thereby improving service delivery outcomes. 
Citizen and community empowerment can improve the quality of public services, but only if there are 
complementary governance reforms. Reforming the bureaucracy, the political process, the judiciary, and frontline 
service providers is a prerequisite to effective empowerment. If state institutions are impervious to demand 
pressures in the manner in which they do business, little will change. 
PPPs are an effective means to expand access to and improve the quality of basic services. In developing 
such partnerships, it is essential to properly match the provider with the type of public service being contracted. 
It is also essential to design a compensation scheme sufficient for non-state providers to provide high-quality 
services to the poor. Government regulation of non-state providers is also important. 
Through transparency, as well as awareness of and access to information, ICT enables citizens to demand 
improvements in the efficiency of service provision. In most countries in the region, e-delivery of services and 
usable content has lagged far behind available infrastructure. Demand for ICT services is fragmented. Public–
private–NGO partnerships and social venture funds are essential for widening the spread of e-delivery of public 
services. 
Data on the quality of public services are woefully inadequate in much of developing Asia and the Pacific, 
with few countries employing a system of routine data collection on service quality. Governments in the region 
need to begin collecting data on the provision and quality of public services on a regular and consistent basis. 
A good start would be an agreement on a common set of indicators of service provision and service quality in 
different sectors. 

Introduction
Developing Asia and the Pacific has made great strides in reducing poverty and is an 
early achiever in attaining some of the 2015 Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 
targets—notably, improving access to safe drinking water, promoting gender equality, 
achieving universal primary education, and preventing the spread of HIV/AIDS, 
malaria, and other communicable diseases. However, the region remains home to 
two-thirds of the world’s poor, with over 800 million people living below $1.25 a day 
and 1.7 billion surviving below $2 a day (Brooks et al. 2013). Moreover, the progress 
toward the MDGs has been uneven across subregions (UN 2012). The region as a 
whole still faces moderate to high levels of hunger and maternal mortality and lack 
of productive and decent employment. Furthermore, inequality in the region has 
risen in the last two decades, creating a new rich–poor social and economic divide 
(ADB 2012a).
Provision of adequate and high quality public services is critical to making 
continued progress in reducing poverty, achieving the MDGs, and addressing 
inequality in developing Asia. A public delivery system that is geared to the needs 
of the community and that provides food (and nutritional requirements), health 
services, medical attention, educational facilities, and other basic amenities of living 
can bring the essentials of livelihood within easy reach of people whose lives may 
otherwise respond very slowly—or not at all—to the growth of average gross domestic 
product (GDP).
More generally, essential public services are considered vital for human 
functioning and personal well-being (e.g., safe drinking water and sanitation, 
communicable disease control), societal functioning (e.g., safety and environmental 
standards, settlement of land and property disputes, and law and order), economic 
activity (e.g., electricity, roads, and telecommunications infrastructure), and human 
capital formation (i.e., schools, early childhood programs, literacy programs, etc.).1 
Other services, including agricultural extension services for farmers, family planning 
programs, and supplemental income assistance schemes, are deemed necessary 
to achieve national development objectives, such as income redistribution, poverty 
alleviation, and population stabilization. By improving the quality of human capital, 
public services support long-term economic growth. 
Governments can provide public services to their citizens either directly (i.e., 
via government providers) or indirectly (via private or nongovernment providers who 
are financed or subsidized by the government for providing these services). Despite 
significant progress, the level of service provision in developing Asia remains low, and 
there are large differences across countries in the quality of and access to services 
by low-income groups and the poor. Ensuring adequate delivery of quality public 
services and equal access to these services by everyone in the society requires policy 
actions in many areas, such as strengthening administrative capacity, effectiveness 
of the judiciary, efficiency and governance quality of frontline public service providers, 
and empowering citizens. 
1 For instance, the PROBE public report on basic education in India proclaims that “elementary educa-
tion is a fundamental right of every child. Guaranteeing this right is not just a matter of welfare or 
development, but one of basic social justice” (The PROBE Team 1999).
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Progress and Problems in Service 
Provision in Developing Asia 
Improvements in Service Delivery  
and Outcomes
In much of developing Asia, significant progress has been made in recent decades in 
the delivery of public services. This is especially evident in education, health, drinking 
water, and sanitation services. 
The expansion of education facilities has resulted in most countries in the 
region having near-universal net primary enrollment rates, exceeding the global 
average of 90.7% (Figure 1). School expectancy has also increased impressively. In 
East Asia and the Pacific, the average number of years of schooling a child can expect 
to complete has increased from about 7 years in 1970 to 12 years in 2010 (Figure 2), 
while in South and West Asia, the number has increased from about 5.5 years to a 
little over 10 years. In South and West Asia, which was home to the largest number 
of out-of-school children in 1990, the number of primary school-aged out-of-school 
children declined from 39 million in 1990 to only about 13 million in 2010 (with most 
of the decline occurring from 2000 to 2010), indicating remarkably improved access 
to primary schooling (Figure 3). 
 Figure 1. Net Primary Enrollment Rates, 2010 
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Figure 2. School Life Expectancy in Years
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Figure 3. Global Number of Out-of-School Children of Primary School Age
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Asia’s overall performance in health outcomes has been equally impressive. 
Between 1990 and 2009, average life expectancy at birth increased by 6 years in the 
two World Health Organization (WHO) regions that span Asia—South and Eastern Asia 
and the Western Pacific (Figure 4). This was the largest increase in life expectancy of 
any world region. Under-5 mortality rates have also fallen significantly in developing 
Asia. Bangladesh, Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), the 
Maldives, and Nepal are countries whose under-5 mortality rates were higher than 
the global average in 1970 but significantly lower than the global average in 2011 
(Figure 5).
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Figure 5. Trends in Under-5 Mortality Rate in Selected Asian Countries
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The improvements in educational and health outcomes in large part reflect 
expanded population access to publicly provided schooling and health care services. 
The latter in turn have been made possible by the region’s rapid economic growth, 
which has increased the resources available for publicly provisioned services. 
Of course, as incomes have increased, there has been a huge increase in privately 
provided health and education services as well, and this has also contributed to 
improved health and education outcomes.
However, although Asia has performed well in the aggregate in education and 
health services, the performance has been uneven across countries. For instance, in 
Sri Lanka, almost the entire population has access to education services and school 
attendance by primary-school-aged children is close to 100%. Viet Nam and Indonesia 
follow closely, but Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Pakistan fall below 90% attendance 
rates among primary children (Son 2012). Despite impressive increases in schooling 
attainment, South and West Asia has the second lowest expected schooling years of 
any world region, next only to Sub-Saharan Africa.
As regards other public services such as basic infrastructure, access to 
water and sanitation vary widely across the region and increased in virtually every 
Asian developing country in recent years (Khan and Zhuang 2013; Figures 6 and 
7). However, the access varies across countries. The largest relative increases 
occurred in Lao PDR and Cambodia, although the levels of access in these countries 
are still among the lowest in Asia. Among the low- and middle-income countries, 
the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Viet Nam tend to have good access to safe water 
and sanitation. In general, across much of Asia, access to safe water is better than 
access to sanitation. Figure 8 shows population access to electricity across the same 
set of countries in 2009. Again, relative to their income, the Philippines, Viet Nam, 
and Sri Lanka have relatively widespread access to electricity, while Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Myanmar rank relatively low on this criterion. The 
Appendix to this report presents examples based on selected ADB projects on the 
variety and mix of different types of services that can be provided either separately 
or jointly to improve the outcomes.
Figure 6. Access to Improved Water Sources in Selected Asian Countries
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Figure 7. Access to Improved Sanitation in Selected Asian Countries
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Figure 8. Access to Electricity in Selected Asian Countries, 2009 
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Disparities in Access
Impressive country-level performances mask the distributional disparities in access 
within countries. The benefits of public services tend to accrue disproportionately to 
the nonpoor, while the amounts spent by governments on services the poor need 
most, such as primary education, preventive health care, and drinking water, are 
limited. Inequalities in access to health services such as immunizations and delivery 
of births are evident. For example, residents in Pakistan face unequal access even 
as the government spends less than 1% of GDP (Akram and Khan 2007). Provincial 
expenditures in rural areas are generally regressive except for preventive measures. 
In the Philippines, not only do the poor have lower access to health care services, 
their access relative to the nonpoor declined over the 10-year period from 1998 to 
2007 (Son 2009). Access by the poor to skilled health personnel during child delivery 
is much lower compared to that by the rich in most Asian countries (Table 1).
Table 1. Percent of Women Who Received Skilled Antenatal Care  
 
Country Year
Wealth quintile
Lowest Second Third Fourth Highest
Bangladesh 2007 22.4 27.7 37.4 56.8 79.8
Cambodia 2005 55.2 63.7 68.4 77.6 90.2
India 2005/06 52.0 64.5 76.4 87.7 96.2
Indonesia 2007 82.2 92.1 95.5 98.5 99.2
Nepal 2006 17.7 30.5 38.4 60.7 84.1
Pakistan 2006/07 36.9 48.3 61.4 73.7 91.9
Philippines 2008 77.1 91.4 95.9 97.6 98.3
Viet Nam 2002 51.7 61.7 68.9 78.8 97.0
Note: Data is for the most recent birth in the 5 years preceding the survey by wealth quintile.
Source: Wang et al. (2011). 
Wealth-influenced inequality in education persists. In Bhutan, the net 
attendance rate for primary schooling for the top quintile households (based on 
per capita household expenditure) was more than twice as high as that for the 
bottom quintile. In Pakistan, it was about twice as high (ADB 2012a). A nationally 
representative socioeconomic survey of 41,500 rural and urban households in India 
revealed that while only 9% of 8-year-olds in the poorest quintile could read a story, 
32% of those in the richest quintile could do so (Figure 9). Likewise, only 4% of the 
poorest 8-year-olds were able to do division; 18% in the richest quintile could do so. 
Moreover, only 39% of the poorest 8-year-olds were able to pass an English writing 
test, while 72% of the richest could do so. Data from Sri Lanka similarly noted that 
the test scores of students from the richest quintile far exceeded the scores of the 
poorest students (Figure 10). 
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Figure 9. Ability to Read a Story by Expenditure Quintile, Children 8–11 Years Old 
in India, 2005
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Source: Data Sharing for Demographic Research. Indian Human Development Survey, 2005.  
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/DSDR/studies/22626 
Many countries, such as those in East Asia, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia, 
have made progress in achieving gender equality in secondary education. Gender 
gaps in South Asia and other countries in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, however, 
remain wide (ADB 2012a). Afghanistan’s decreasing ratio of girls’ and boys’ secondary 
education should be alarming. There has been a considerable achievement in 
improving people’s health in Asia, but health inequality is still a problem. Figure 11 
shows infant mortality rates for those in the bottom quintile of wealth against those 
of the top quintile for countries classified by region, and it indicates developing Asia’s 
poor performance in reducing disparities in infant mortality by wealth quintile.  
Figure 10. Test Scores of Grade 4 Students in Sri Lanka, 2003
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Source: Aturupane, Glewwe, and Wisniewski (2007).
Figure 11. Disparities in Infant Mortality Rate, Urban
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Issues of Service Quality 
Measuring the quality of public services is not easy. One approach involves gathering 
information from users on their level of satisfaction with public services, but this can 
be problematic because of differences in user expectations. In places where service 
quality is consistently poor, clients have very low expectations of public providers and 
can report satisfaction with even very low levels of quality. Another approach, which 
is being increasingly used in the education and health sectors in many countries, is to 
measure the rates of absence of public providers from their workplace. Unannounced 
random visits to schools and health centers, for example, are now established 
methods to estimate teacher or health worker absenteeism rates (Chaudhury et al. 
2006; Kremer et al. 2011; Muralidharan et al. 2013).2 By measuring direct outcomes 
and by combining them with available subnational data, these measures provide a 
more fine-tuned and accurate picture of the state of public service provision.
The issue of absenteeism among teachers in government schools and health 
workers in public clinics was prominently discussed in the World Development Report 
2004 (World Bank 2003). The evidence of poor service quality in health and education 
has only grown since then. A recent study for India found that despite substantial 
improvement in several measures of school quality, including school infrastructure 
and pupil–teacher ratios, teacher absence rates had barely changed between 
2003 and 2010 (Figure 12 and Muralidharan et al. 2013). However, there were 
wide variations across states, with some, such as Punjab, Chattisgarh, Uttaranchal, 
Bihar, and Assam, experiencing large declines in teacher absence rates but other 
states (e.g., Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh) experiencing a 
worsening of the situation.
Muralidharan et al. (2013) found strong evidence for the hypothesis that better 
monitoring of public schools and teachers reduces teacher absences. Villages where 
schools had been inspected in the 3 months preceding the survey had teacher 
absence rates that were 6.5 percentage points (about a quarter) lower than those 
that had not been inspected. They calculated the fiscal cost of teacher absences from 
public schools at about $1.5 billion per year, and estimated that investing in improved 
governance by increasing the frequency of teacher monitoring would yield a ninefold 
return on investment.
Another study for Indonesia, using a nationally representative survey of public 
primary schools, found a national teacher absence rate of 19%, with almost half of the 
absences due to unacceptable reasons. Usman, Akhmadi, and Suryadarma (2007) 
found highly educated teachers, contract teachers, and less-experienced teachers to 
have higher absence rates. Unlike Muralidharan et al. (2013), Usman, Akhmadi, and 
Suryadarma (2007) found that inspections, sanctions, and community involvement 
did not seem to increase teacher attendance, which they attribute to sanctions 
on shirking teachers rarely being implemented. However, they did find evidence to 
suggest that teacher recognition programs work in reducing teacher absences.
2 Likewise, instead of relying on subjective assessments of corruption, public expenditure tracking 
surveys (PETS) are now widely used to follow the flow of funds (Reinikka and Svensson 2003; Koziol 
and Tolmie 2010).
Figure 12. Absence Rates of Teachers in Rural Public Schools by State, India
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The evidence suggests that the situation is even worse in the health sector: 
Chaudhury and Hammer (2004) found that the absence rate for doctors in health 
clinics in Bangladesh was as high as 40%. In cases where monitoring was poor, 
absence rates were even higher: single doctors posted to the most remote rural 
clinics were absent 74% of the time. For primary health centers, Chaudhury et al. 
(2006) found absence rates ranging from 25% in Peru to 40% in India, and Banerjee, 
Deaton, and Duflo (2004) found absence rates of 45% in local health centers in rural 
Udaipur (Figure 13). 
Of course, the mere presence of a health worker does not guarantee a high 
quality of health services: health workers may resort to rule-of-thumb decisions and 
overmedicate patients rather than follow through with time-intensive diagnosis. Das 
and Hammer (2004) evaluated the quality of doctors in Delhi by testing their ability 
to diagnose and treat a range of common illnesses. The authors presented doctors 
with a set of five hypothetical cases (vignettes) and asked how they would treat these 
cases. The average quality of doctors was found to be very low; for diarrhea, a common 
illness in developing countries, the probability that an average provider gives the 
correct treatment—oral rehydration therapy—is as low as 30%. Even if doctors were 
able to provide the correct treatment in the hypothetical cases, they often deviated 
from the textbook treatments when treating real-life patients.
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Figure 13. Provider Absence Rates in Selected Countries, 2003–2005
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The low quality of public services in education results in poor student learning 
outcomes. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), an international comparative 
survey of 15-year-olds’ knowledge and skills in reading, math, and science, was 
administered in 2009 to children in 75 countries around the world. Relatively few of 
these countries were in Asia. The PISA 2009 results (Figure 14) indicated that while 
students in some countries in Asia (Hong Kong, China; Singapore; and the Republic of 
Korea) have superior learning outcomes (indeed, they perform better than students 
in many European countries and the United States), students in developing Asia (i.e., 
India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, and the Kyrgyz Republic) perform quite poorly. Two 
Indian states, Tamil Nadu and Himachal Pradesh, participated in PISA 2009 for the 
first time, as did Shanghai, People’s Republic of China (PRC).3 
3 Indeed, students in Shanghai were the best performers in PISA 2009.
Figure 14. International Test Scores of 15-Year Olds in Selected Asian Countries, 
2009 (PISA)
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Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2009).
There is another evidence that supports that student learning outcomes in 
developing Asia are very low. A national learning assessment in rural India in 2011 
showed that just over a quarter of grade 5 students in rural India could divide a three-
digit number by a single-digit number (Figure 15 and ASER Centre 2011). About 43% 
of grade 8 students could not even solve a simple division problem. Recognition of 
two-digit numbers does not become widespread until grades 4 or 5, even though this 
competency is supposed to be acquired by grade 2. A similar learning assessment 
in rural Pakistan showed arithmetic competency to be somewhat better than in rural 
India, but still very low in absolute terms (Figure 16). For instance, only 37% of grade 5 
students could divide a three-digit number by a single-digit number, and 28% of grade 
8 students could perform simple division. Unlike in rural India, however, recognition of 
two-digit numbers is widespread by grade 3 among rural students in Pakistan.
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Figure 15. Student Arithmetic Achievement by Grade in Rural India, 2011
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Figure 16. Student Arithmetic Achievement by Grade in Rural Pakistan, 2011 
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Source: South Asian Forum for Education Development (2012).
Even more troubling is some evidence to suggest that student learning 
achievements have fallen over time in rural India. The ASER assessments, which 
have been conducted annually since 2005 without a change in methodology, show 
that between 2006 and 2011, the proportion of students in grade 3 who could read 
at grade 1 level fell from 48% to 40%, and the proportion of students in grade 5 
who could read at the grade 3 level fell from 53% to 48%. In arithmetic, student 
achievement appears to have plunged even further: the percentage of third graders 
able to perform subtraction fell from 45% to 28% and that of fifth graders able to 
perform division from 49% to 30% (Figure 17). Even after note is taken of the fact 
that this is a period in which the enrollment ratio and the coverage of school-aged 
children sharply increased, bringing into schools, for the first time, children from 
many extremely disadvantaged families (often first-generation school children), the 
decline in performance standard is steep and difficult to explain.
Figure 17. Student Achievement in Reading and Arithmetic in Rural India, 2006–2011
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Source: ASER Centre. Various Years. Annual Status of Education Report India (Online). http://www.pratham.org/M-19-3-ASER.aspx
In the health sector, the poor delivery of publicly provided health services has 
caused a flight of consumers to the private sector. In many countries in developing 
Asia, public providers account for a minority of patients, even among the poor 
(Figure 18). In the Philippines, for instance, only 25% of children aged 0–5 in the 
poorest wealth quintile who were seeking treatment for an illness visited a public 
provider, with the rest going to formal or informal private providers. Another indicator 
of weak public service delivery is the share of private spending in total health 
spending; private health expenditures account for two-thirds or more of total health 
expenditure in much of developing Asia, with the exception of Indonesia, the PRC, 
the Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan, and Bhutan (Figure 19). Furthermore, because 
of the absence of health insurance coverage, the vast majority of private spending 
on health—in some cases, as high as 99%—is in the form of out-of-pocket spending 
by households (Figure 19). Thus, the absence of high-quality public services in the 
health sector has a large adverse financial impact on poor households. 
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Figure 18. Choice of Public or Private Health Provider by Wealth Quintile, 2005
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Figure 19. Private and Public Health Expenditure across Selected Asian Countries, 2008–2012
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A major problem in analyzing the quality of service delivery is that few countries 
have a system of routine collection of service quality data. The only data that are 
available are from (nonrandom) surveys of providers and facilities. As such, it is 
difficult to make any rigorous comparisons of service quality across countries. This 
is in contrast to measures of utilization and outcomes, data on which are routinely 
collected by the administrative agencies in most developing countries.
Concerns with Governance  
The earlier discussions suggest that while there has been an impressive expansion of 
public services in developing Asia, not only are there wide variations in performance 
across countries, but also a large proportion of population still lacks access to some 
of the very basic services. A further challenge is to improve the quality of public 
services, which is intricately linked to the larger issue of dysfunctional governance 
systems including, among other things, leakage of public funds meant for service 
delivery, malfeasance and rent seeking by public providers, corruption, and lack of 
transparency in budgets.
Data from the World Bank’s Doing Business Indicators (DBI) measure well-
defined outcomes that proxy for certain dimensions of good governance and regulatory 
quality and are particularly useful for private service providers. For example, the DBI 
measures the days taken to start a business, to enforce a business contract, or to 
obtain an electricity connection. Obviously, the fewer the number of days needed to 
obtain a publicly provided business service, the higher is the presumed quality of the 
underlying public service.
Table 2, which reports the number of days needed for four services, i.e., starting 
a business, enforcing a contract, getting an electricity connection for a business, 
and resolving insolvency, shows wide variations in this number not only across 
world regions but also across different types of services. It takes longer to enforce a 
business contract and obtain an electricity connection in South Asia than in any other 
part of the world. In contrast, companies in East Asia and the Pacific need the fewest 
days to obtain these two services. However, and surprisingly, South Asia requires the 
fewest days of any world region to start a business—only 19, compared to 36 days 
in East Asia and the Pacific and 53 days in Latin America and the Caribbean. In 
resolving insolvency, East Asia and South Asia are not too dissimilar, with countries in 
both regions requiring about 3 years. This is much longer than in the OECD countries 
but shorter than those in the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa.
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Table 2. Cost of Doing Business by World Region, 2013
Number of days needed to perform task
Region
Start a 
business
Enforce 
contracts
Get 
electricity
Resolve 
insolvency
East Asia and the Pacific 36 522 86 2.9
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 14 414 153 2.4
Latin America and Caribbean 53 727 66 3.1
Middle East and North Africa 23 652 84 3.4
OECD 12 510 98 1.7
South Asia 19 1,075 148 3
Sub-Saharan Africa 34 649 133 3.4
OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
Source: World Bank (2013).
Figure 20 shows the same data for two services—starting a business and 
enforcing contracts—for individual countries in developing Asia. Again, there are 
wide variations across countries. While it takes only 7 days to start a business in 
Sri Lanka, it takes as many as 92 days to start one in the Lao PDR. In terms of 
enforcing business contracts, the Philippines and India are relatively efficient, while 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Cambodia are the least efficient countries. 
Figure 20. Number of Days Needed to Start a Business and to Enforce a Business Contract 
in Selected Asian Countries, 2013
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Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic, PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
Source: World Bank (2013).
An interesting aspect of the DBI is that they are available at the subnational level 
(albeit only for a small set of countries). These measures reveal considerable variation 
in the quality of public services within a given country. Table 3 shows the mean and 
measures of dispersion (variance and range) for two measures of public services 
provision (number of days required for a business to enforce a business contract and 
to register property), based on subnational DBI. While the large differences in means 
point to substantial cross-country differences in the quality of public good provision, 
the measures of dispersion also reveal a large subnational variation. The range in the 
days needed to enforce a contract in the PRC, for example, is 428 days: in Nanjing, 
enforcement only takes about 112 days, while in Changchun it takes 540 days. 
Similarly, in India, enforcing a contract takes 600 days in Guwahati, but 1,420 days 
in Mumbai. The large standard deviations are indicative of substantial variation in the 
quality of public services within countries.
Table 3. Subnational Differences in the Cost of Doing Business
Indicator
Enforce contracts Register property
(number of days required) (number of days required)
PRC
2008
India
2009
Pakistan  
2010
PRC
2008
India
2009
Pakistan
2010
Philippines
2011
Mean 319 961 1,261 52  55 42 37
Std. dev.  89 218   393 14  30  7 14
Range 428 820 1,460 50 102 22 59
PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Source: World Bank (2013).  Figure 20. Number of Days Needed to Start a Business and to Enforce a Business Contract 
in Selected Asian Countries, 2013
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How Can Empowered People Exercise 
their Power to Improve Service 
Delivery?
Ensuring adequate delivery of quality public services and equal access to these 
services by everyone in society requires policy actions in many areas. These include, but 
may not be limited to, capacity of the bureaucracy, the political process, effectiveness 
of the judiciary, efficiency and governance quality of frontline public providers, and 
empowerment of citizens. In recent years, more and more countries are turning to 
empowerment as an important means to improve public services delivery.
Empowerment—the Client Power  
The concept of empowerment is motivated by Sen’s rights and capability approach. 
This approach emphasizes the freedom of choice, capability, and opportunity. That 
is, people should be free to choose what they want to do, have the functional ability 
to put those choices into action, and have an enabling environment that allows them 
to actually perform those actions (Sen 2005). “The concept of freedom emphasizes 
the importance of empowering people to help themselves, and of focusing on 
individuals as the actors of their own development” (Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi 
2009:151). Empowerment thus enables deprived people to be effective agents of 
their own human development. For example, when microfinance institutions began 
working with poor village women in Kerala, India, who were earning their livelihoods 
by breaking stones, the women acquired and felt “real freedom” to go to banks or 
offices (Ibrahim and Alkire 2007). 
“Differences in the capability to function can arise even with the same set of 
personal means (such as primary goods) for a variety of reasons, such as: (1) physical 
or mental heterogeneities among persons (related, for example, to disability, or 
proneness to illness); (2) variations in non-personal resources (such as the nature 
of public health care, or societal cohesion and the helpfulness of the community); 
(3) environmental diversities (such as climatic conditions, or varying threats from 
epidemic diseases or from local crime); or (4) different relative positions vis-à-vis 
others … “ (Sen 2005:154).
The concept of empowerment has been viewed in its different dimensions, 
including initial endowments, opportunities, freedom of choice, and the capacity 
of individuals and groups to make effective choices and convert them into desired 
outcomes (World Bank’s World Development Report 2001; Narayan 2005; Alsop, 
Bertelsen, and Holland, 2006; Ibrahim and Alkire 2007). Empowerment is key to 
building assets of the poor and helping them rise out of poverty (see Box 1 for a broad 
definition of empowerment).
Empowerment enables citizens and communities to hold the state accountable 
for the delivery of basic services. Client-citizens also have the possibility to influence 
the quality of services provided by directly exercising client power on the service 
providers. Empowerment can occur through many different mechanisms: rights-
based entitlements, whereby the state offers citizens the right to information as 
well as the right to specific social services and basic necessities (such as food, 
employment, health, and education); participatory performance monitoring, 
where citizens and communities monitor and evaluate the implementation and 
performance of public services, often according to indicators they themselves 
have selected, and then demand better performance from service providers; and 
community participation and community-driven development, where groups of 
users of services or entire communities participate in the delivery of services, 
thereby controlling directly the quantity and quality of services provided.4
4 This review limits itself to a discussion of specific empowerment-enabling mechanisms and 
does not consider larger societal and economic transformations that also empower people—
factors such as freedom from poverty, broad-based literacy and education, access to well-
paying and meaningful jobs, and democratic reform. These changes in society and economy 
can empower citizens and allow them to hold the state and public providers accountable for 
delivery of public goods and services.
     Box 1. The Meaning of Empowerment
Empowerment is “… the expansion of assets and capabilities of poor people to 
participate in, negotiate with, influence, control, and hold accountable institutions 
that affect their lives.” In its broadest sense, empowerment is the expansion of 
freedom of choice and action. Assets and capabilities can be individual or collective.
The four key elements to empower poor people are (i) access to information, 
(ii) inclusion and participation, (iii) accountability, and (iv) local organizational 
capability. These elements are closely intertwined and act in synergy. Informed 
citizens are better equipped to take advantage of opportunities, access to services, 
exercise their rights, negotiate effectively, and hold state and non-state actors 
accountable.
The key assumption is that investment in poor people and their organizations 
generally leads to improved development results, which include among other 
things (i) improved governance, (ii) better functioning and more inclusive services, 
(iii) more equitable access to markets, (iv) strengthened civil society and poor 
people’s organizations, and (v) increased assets and freedom of choice. Such 
investments, however, are to be predicated by state reform, which puts a premium 
on support for empowerment. 
      Source: Narayan (2002).
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Citizen Rights, Participation, and Oversight 
Rights-Based Entitlements
Some public services are considered essential enough for a decent human life that 
they are counted as fundamental human rights. A common form of empowerment 
is through rights-based entitlements, which are enforceable rights enshrined in the 
legal framework or national constitutions with specific roles and responsibilities of 
implementing authorities as well as criteria for beneficiary eligibility and procedures 
for identification. There are two types of rights-based entitlements: first, the right of 
eligible citizens to specific services; and second, the right to information, which is 
an instrument to ensure that citizens can influence the fulfillment of their rights to 
services. In both cases, it is the binding obligation of the state to ensure that eligible 
citizens receive the specific entitlement being guaranteed.
The rights-based approach has been adopted by many low- and middle-income 
countries that grant to individuals the right to specific social services and basic 
necessities (such as food, employment, health, and education). Some 135 countries 
worldwide have made education a fundamental right. In Asia, constitutional provisions 
in Pakistan and Bangladesh require the state to provide free and compulsory primary 
education. A number of countries in Asia including Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, 
the Philippines, and Sri Lanka provide the right to water.5 The right to health has 
been recognized in the constitutions of Indonesia, the Maldives, Nepal, Thailand, and 
Timor-Leste (WHO 2011). The constitutions of Bhutan, Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, 
and Sri Lanka do not recognize the right to health as a fundamental right but compel 
the state to provide health services.
Extension of the rights-based approach to broader social protection has been 
especially prominent in the former Soviet Union, including the countries of the South 
Caucasus and Central Asia, such as Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and the Kyrgyz 
Republic. In these countries, despite the collapse of the socialist welfare model, many 
countries have retained the universal right to social protection for specific population 
groups. These, for example, include child and maternity benefits, disability allowance, and 
old-age pensions. The governments of Nepal and Thailand have institutionalized social 
or noncontributory pensions for older people as a universal entitlement (Handayani and 
Babajanian 2012). There is currently strong international support for institutionalizing 
a Social Protection Floor (SPF) to promote the rights-based approach (proposed by 
the United Nations, approved by governments in the 2010 Millennium Development 
Summit and with explicit commitment by the Group of 20 countries; see ILO 2012).6 
 SPF requires (i) provision of at least minimum levels of social services, and (ii) a focus 
on equal accessibility to these services to eradicate poverty (Piron 2004:26).
5 The Rights to Water and Sanitation. http://www.righttowater.info/progress-so-far/ 
national-legislation-on-the-right-to-water
6 SPF is an “integrated set of social policies designed to guarantee income security and access to 
essential services for all, paying particular attention to vulnerable groups and protecting and empow-
ering people across the life cycle” (ILO 2012: xxii). It incorporates basic income security in the form 
of cash or in-kind transfers, and universal access to essential affordable social services, including 
health, water and sanitation, education, food security, housing, and others.
As far back as 1946, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 59(I), stating 
that “… freedom of information is a fundamental human right and ... the touchstone of 
all the freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated.” While many countries in 
Asia have enshrined the right of citizens to information in their constitutions, few have 
put much emphasis on enforcing this right. One country where this right has been 
used extensively in the last few years is India where the Parliament passed the Right 
to Information (RTI) Act in 2005. Indeed, India has probably gone farther than most 
countries in developing Asia in putting the rights-based approach into practice. The 
two most powerful “rights” movements in India—the right to work (Box 2) and the right 
to food—have their roots firmly in the RTI movement that began in the mid-1990s as 
a fundamental element of citizens’ right to participate in governance processes. The 
RTI has opened up the state to detailed scrutiny and has been used by citizens and 
civil society groups to monitor government functioning and audit programs (Box 3).7 
It has also forced the bureaucracy to acknowledge the concepts of transparency, 
accountability, and people’s empowerment.8
 
7 For instance, the RTI Assessment and Analysis Group (RAAG) conducted the only nationwide study on 
RTI implementation in 2008 and estimated that in its first 2.5 years, over 2 million RTI applications 
had been filed (RAAG 2008). The executive summary is available at http://rti-assessment.org. The 
scale of RTI requests has only grown since then.
8 This is not to suggest that there was no acknowledgment of the importance of transparency prior to 
the RTI Act. In fact, a close reading of the evolution of the RTI movement suggests that the move-
ment got its teeth precisely because it formed alliances with reform-minded bureaucrats who worked 
closely with the group to push the agenda and draft the law. What the RTI has done is to main-
stream this agenda and ensure that these ideas are part and parcel of the day-to-day government 
vocabulary.
Box 2. India’s Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment  
Guarantee Scheme
 
The employment scheme under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act 2006 (NREGA) is an extraordinarily ambitious program. In essence, it seeks 
to provide a form of employment security for the entire rural population of India, with the 
primary goal of providing a basic safety net (for households with able-bodied workers, 
capable of undertaking manual labor), but also with the aim of empowering the rural 
poor. Critical to the design is the guarantee of 100 days of paid employment for unskilled 
manual work to any rural household in India. Targeting is, in principle, exclusively through 
willingness to undertake the offered manual work. Making this an act was also judged to 
be critical to making it an institutionalized system outside the vagaries of party politics.
The reach of NREGA is impressive. It has grown to include one-fourth of all rural households. 
However, as might be expected of such a huge program, experiences on the ground have 
been mixed. First, the guarantee of work appears to be imperfectly delivered. Studies using 
data from the National Sample Survey find high levels of reported unmet demand, with 
demand being higher in relatively poorer states probably because of weaker administrative 
capacity (see Box Figure).
Second, while comprehensive measures of impact are not available, a number of studies 
suggest some positive results. One study of 1,500 households found that NREGA was the 
largest source of income for 17% of households in Andhra Pradesh, 10% in Rajasthan, and 
7% in Maharashtra (7%). Another study conducted among more than 1,300 households 
in Andhra Pradesh suggested that household monthly per capita expenditure increased 
by 40% on food and 69% on non-food as a result of the NREGA.2 However, these studies 
are based on small samples in states with relatively good coverage (and with tricky 
issues of identification of actual impacts after taking account of any foregone income). 
Continued next page
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There is also positive evidence on the targeting performance of NREGA. Poor households 
are observed to be more likely to participate in the scheme. There are above-average 
person-days generated for persons from scheduled castes and scheduled tribes (51% 
of total), and women account for 47% of the total person-days generated (albeit with a 
wide variation across states). However, in all of these cases, the targeting performance 
is better the lower the degree of rationing, as measured by the extent of reported unmet 
demand.
Box Figure. State-level Poverty and Unmet Demand for Work
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Third, the scheme has been criticized for distorting market mechanisms, creating 
dependency, and raising private-sector wages. Conceptually, this need not be the case. 
Indeed, the scheme is potentially market-improving to the extent that it reduces insurance 
market failures, allowing poor households to invest in higher-return activities, including 
keeping their children in school. However, this depends critically on the level of the wages 
paid under the scheme. A higher wage increases transfer benefits, but a higher-than-
market wage can distort signals, and discourage private labor demand. On average, the 
state-wise payment structure of the minimum wage for unskilled labor varies from Rs122 
(Bihar) to Rs191 (Haryana). It is still unclear if political pressures to raise wages at the 
state level (financed by the central government) are excessively distortionary. One study,3 
using monthly data from 2000-2011 in 250 districts (across 19 states) in India, shows 
that the real daily agricultural (unskilled labor) wage rate did increase as a consequence 
of NREGA, but only modestly. 
A final category of criticism concerns reports of failure to pay wages and the existence of 
“ghost” workers and corruption. There is also anecdotal evidence of links to local politics, 
a source of rent extraction the panchayat level. Local politicians can skim off private 
rents from the scheme, and this has been alleged to be one of the incentives for rising 
campaign spending around panchayati raj elections.
1 See Jha, Gaiha, and Pandey (2012). 
2 See Berg et al. (2012). 
3 See Engler and Ravi (2009); Jha, Gaiha, and Pandey (2012). 
Source: Aiyar and Walton (2013).
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Box 3. India’s Experience with the Right to Information Act
India’s experience with the Right to Information (RTI) Act is instructive. It has opened up 
the state to detailed scrutiny, created new axes around which citizens can mobilize in 
order to demand accountability, and put a great deal of pressure on public institutions to 
respond. Decision makers and public providers are more cautious, given the expectation 
of scrutiny. In 2011–2012, a mere 8% of a total of 629,960 RTI applications were rejected. 
A research study by Peisakhin and Pinto (2010) found that while bribing is still the most 
efficient way to access government services, filing an RTI request is almost as effective.
However, there is little evidence that the RTI has fundamentally transformed governance 
structures. To actually improve service delivery, it will need to be anchored in a larger 
project for administrative reform. This would involve dealing with the larger issues of how 
the bureaucracy is embedded in political patronage, the incentives that managers face 
at the local level, career paths, and so on. For instance, rules and regulations have been 
formulated, public information officers have been appointed, and RTI applications are 
responded to. However, substantive changes that could reform the government’s way 
of doing business—reviewing internal rules and procedures, building official capacity to 
collect and record information, and reforming record management systems to enable 
departments to disclose information more efficiently—have not been made.
In sum, India’s experience with RTI has been mixed. It has genuinely empowered citizens 
to scrutinize the government and hold it to account—and citizens have responded to this 
enthusiastically. It has planted seeds of change by forcing a system that traditionally 
exercised its power through its opacity and distance from citizens to, at a minimum, 
acknowledge the importance of transparency, accountability, and people’s empowerment. 
There is limited evidence, however, of the momentum generated through the RTI to 
initiate systemic reform within the bureaucracy and create a genuinely transparent mode 
of governance. This is sobering, for in the long term it may mean that the RTI was an 
opportunity lost for India.
Source: Aiyar and Walton (2013); Peisakhin and Pinto (2010).
Simply proclaiming a public good as a human right is meaningless unless there 
is a social or legal structure for the realization and fulfillment of this right (Box 4). The 
philosopher and legal theorist, Herbert Hart, has defined a moral right to a good or 
service as a recommendation that the good or service should be provisioned through 
legislation, followed by enforcement (Hart 1955; see also Raz 1984). Legislation, 
however, is not the only means of enhancing the provision of goods and services that 
public reasoning may demand. For example, providing public monitoring, or more 
media coverage of gaps and lapses, or more client pressure for better services can 
be very effective in the realization of recognized human rights, so that the pursuit of 
human rights has to go beyond the limits of law and draw on public empowerment 
(Sen 2006 and 2009). The social as well as legal routes to the realization of human 
rights will be extensively discussed in the sections to follow.
Some analysis suggests that legalizing the demands of social and economic 
rights may favor the more affluent rather than poor segments of the population (Gauri 
and Brinks 2008). This is exemplified by the concentration of litigation cases in, 
for example, the richer south and southeast parts of Brazil rather than the poorer 
northeast, and more cases in Delhi than in the poorer states of India. In addition, 
there are more cases addressing university education, rather than primary education, 
which reflects a bias toward the middle class.
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Box 4. Human Rights and Their Realization
“… Unfortunately much writing and rhetoric on rights heedlessly proclaims universal 
rights to goods and services, and in particular ‘welfare rights,’ as well as to other 
social, economic and cultural rights that are prominent in international Charters and 
Declarations, without showing what connects each presumed right-holder to some 
specific obligation-bearer(s), which leaves the content of these supposed rights wholly 
obscure. . . . Some advocates of universal economic, social and cultural rights go no 
further than to emphasize that they can be institutionalized, which is true. But the point 
of difference is that they must be institutionalized: if they are not there is no right (O’Neill 
1996:131–132).
“… The traditional political and civil rights are not difficult to institute. For the most part, 
they require governments, and other people generally, to leave a man alone. . . . The 
problems posed by claims to economic and social rights, however, are of another order 
altogether. How can governments of those parts of Asia, Africa, and South America, where 
industrialization has hardly begun, be reasonably called upon to provide social security 
and holidays with pay for millions of people who inhabit those places and multiply so 
swiftly?” (Cranston 1983:13).
Perhaps the biggest challenge in implementing the rights-based approach is 
the resource constraint that many low-income countries face. Many economic and 
social rights—in social protection, health, and education—are particularly “resource-
intensive” (Munro 2008:33). This has emerged as an important issue in India, 
with its steady and successive extension of rights. There is a fear that realization 
of these rights could lead to government commitments that are both excessive and 
inflexible, threatening macroeconomic instability and crowding out other public sector 
or private investment activity (see, e.g., Kelkar and Shah 2011). At the same time, 
if fundamental rights-based entitlement programs are determined to be a major 
source of addressing poverty and inequality, then it is important to ensure that the 
government’s limited resources are used effectively and efficiently. Quality fiscal 
adjustments require reallocation of public expenditure from inequitable, expensive, 
and untargeted subsidies on, e.g., diesel, petrol, and electricity, to essential services 
and targeted programs. Additionally, resource constraints faced by governments 
create a necessary trade-off between funding capital expenditures and recurrent 
operating and maintenance costs, a vital input to sustaining quality public services. 
Reorienting scarce public resources from largely capital expenditure toward recurrent, 
especially non-wage, expenditure will thus be an essential tool for policy makers to 
improve access by the poor to various types of public services. 
Table 4. Strengths and Weaknesses of Rights-Based Entitlements
Strengths Weaknesses Conditions for success
Provide binding obligations that 
guarantee service delivery
Offer legal channels for claiming 
rights and redress
Promote individual and 
collective rights
May not be feasible in countries with 
limited resources to guarantee citizen 
entitlements
May favor more affluent individuals
Ability to articulate demands for 
services may be restricted by limited 
information and rights awareness, 
and existing inequalities
Restricted physical accessibility or 
lack of service facilities
Adequate resources to finance services and 
infrastructure
Legal rights may not be fulfilled without 
accessible and effective institutional channels to 
enable citizens to claim their rights
Availability of independent judiciary and the rule 
of law
Effective information dissemination, proactive 
citizen outreach, and policy measures to include 
disadvantaged groups
Source: Babajanian (2013).
Table 4 summarizes the main strengths and weaknesses of rights-based 
approaches as well as conditions required for their successful enforcement.
Participatory Performance Monitoring
Participatory performance monitoring (PPM) covers a range of different participatory 
monitoring and evaluation tools, including citizen report cards, community score 
cards, social audits and public hearings, grievance redress systems, and opinion 
surveys. Extensive reviews of the impact and effectiveness of PPM in service delivery 
on accountability and transparency initiatives found that information dissemination 
is a key ingredient of PPM (Joshi 2010; McGee and Gaventa 2010). Moreover, social 
accountability mechanisms in the reviewed programs were effective in exposing 
corruption, increasing awareness of entitlements, empowering people to claim their 
rights, and facilitating citizen engagement in service delivery process. On the other 
hand, based on their review of social accountability interventions supported by the 
World Bank, Agarwal, Heltberg, and Diachok (2009) maintain that impact of social 
accountability approaches is “thin” and that there is a need for rigorous impact 
evaluations that can isolate and measure the impact of these approaches.
Citizen Report Cards
Citizen report cards gather information about the users’ perceptions and views of 
service delivery performance, outcomes, and usefulness, and provide stakeholders 
with feedback for remedial action. This tool seeks to generate citizen awareness 
and stimulate pressure to demand improvements in service delivery. One of the 
most comprehensive reporting efforts was developed in Uganda to evaluate health 
care facilities using technical and inter-personal dimensions of service quality 
(McNamara 2006). 
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The 1994 Bangalore Citizen Report Card, India, which was the first initiative of 
its kind in developing Asia, ranked service performance of public agencies dealing 
with water, power, municipal services, transport, housing, telephone, banks, and 
hospitals. It was later adapted in other countries in Asia and Africa. The report cards 
of 1994 and 1999 sensitized citizens to the importance of asserting their rights 
to better services and contributed to improvement of water, sanitation, power, and 
other services (Ravindra 2004). The Report Card in Ahmedabad, India, conducted in 
1997, documented poor women’s assessment of municipal services, including water, 
electricity, and sewerage (see World Bank’s Citizen Report Cards and Surveys – Asia 
Cases). The survey revealed dissatisfaction with the performance of the services 
and highlighted bottlenecks in accessing the services for a majority of users. While 
only 6% of all respondents complained due to poor expected response, awareness 
creation led to negotiations for step-by-step improvements in service delivery. The 
Citizen Report Card in the Philippines in 2001 sought to gather perceptions of local 
people regarding the quality of services and measured awareness, convenience, and 
the level of satisfaction in nine cities in the national capital region.9 The survey results 
were used by the cities of Makati, Mandaluyong, and Marikina in their planning and 
budgeting. In Makati City, the presentation of the findings led to widespread public 
display of the city emergency numbers in response to the demand of city residents.
Social Audits
Social audits of public services promote direct involvement of citizens in monitoring 
service quality, access, and performance—a process that often culminates in direct 
engagement between the public and service providers at community interface 
meetings. This section discusses examples that represent two distinct operational 
modalities: (i) the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
(NREGA) and the Public Distribution System (PDS) in India that involve public 
monitoring and discussion in public hearings, and (ii) the activities supported by the 
Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Governance (CCAGG) in the Philippines that 
disseminate monitoring findings through organizational pressure.
The launch of NREGA in 2006 for the first time gave the audits a legal mandate 
in India as transparency and accountability safeguards. Since then, social audits 
have become a part of almost every government social sector program. Social audits 
involve obtaining and verifying discrepancies in government records and expenditure 
on services. Violations are discussed by beneficiaries, local self-government members, 
and public officials, and their findings shared with NREGA, district and senior officials 
for implementation. However, the frequency and quality of social audits is a major 
constraint to their effective implementation (Pande and Mann 2012). Andhra 
Pradesh is the only exception where social audits have been institutionalized, an 
independent directorate for conducting audits set up, and almost 1,800 social audits 
conducted between 2006 and 2011. A study by Aiyar and Samji (2009) noted an 
overwhelming impact on awareness levels, implementation processes, and grievance 
redress systems. However, another study by Aiyar, Samji, and Kapoor (2011) revealed 
corruption issues including fictitious beneficiaries, embezzlement of funds, caste and 
gender discrimination, and difficulties in accessing information about the program. 
In March 2011, the audit unearthed Rs1 billion worth of fraud. Both these studies 
confirm the effectiveness of successive social audits in strengthening citizen voice 
through registering of complaints and identification of implicated officials. 
9  See World Bank’s Citizen Report Cards and Surveys – Asia Cases.
Another example of an effective social audit is that of the targeted PDS in 
Warangal district of Andhra Pradesh, India. Since 2010, it has conducted over 1,000 
social audits of PDS. The program involves distribution of essential commodities to 
vulnerable sections of the population at subsidized rates to ensure food security and 
adequate nutrition (Narayanan 2011). Social audits allow residents to cross-check the 
beneficiary names for possible leakages. Their inspections found substantial leakages 
in the supply quantities as well as practices of overcharging the beneficiaries. The 
local dealers were fined for the discrepancies, and there was an increase in closing 
balances and the quantities of food supplied to the beneficiaries.
The CCAGG is a nongovernment organization (NGO) founded in the province of 
Abra in the northern Philippines in 1986. Since 2001, it has conducted a series of 
participatory audits for monitoring the local government infrastructure construction 
projects by involving different social groups, including the poor and women (PAF, 
Sirker, and Cosic 2007: 46). The findings of initial monitoring and verification by 
beneficiary groups are passed on to specialists, including engineers and accountants, 
who in turn conduct more detailed investigations on project sites (Ramkumar and 
Krafchik 2005). Regular monitoring and investigations by CCAGG have gradually led 
to increased cooperation with local governments and there is evidence that some 
local officials use CCAGG assessment reports as a basis for release of public funds 
(PAF, Sirker, and Cosic 2007: 48). 
Community Score Cards
A community score card is a “hybrid” (World Bank 2005) of the institutional 
arrangements for citizen report cards and social audits. They combine participatory 
tracking of service performance (or “input tracking”), service providers’ self-
evaluation, and community interface meetings, in which performance assessments 
are discussed and remedial action plans developed. In contrast to citizen report cards, 
community score cards rely heavily on the participation of community members in 
the assessment of service quality and performance, and negotiation of the findings 
with service providers. Community score cards have been used extensively in India 
(Andhra Pradesh) and Ethiopia.
In 2006, the Center for Good Governance in Hyderabad, India, implemented 
a pilot project to apply a community score card to assess the performance of two 
primary health centers in two blocks of Visakhapatnam District, India (World Bank 
2007). The community score cards collected the views and perceptions of users about 
the ability of health services and the perspectives of the staff of the health centers. 
The processes revealed dissatisfaction with staff behavior and working style, hours 
of operation and availability of medical personnel, and overall weak responsiveness. 
Many users were not aware of their service entitlements and service standards. As 
a result of the exercise, the medical officers and staff underwent training to improve 
their attitudes, the hours of operation of the health centers were changed, and a 
system to redress grievances and display an inventory of available medicine was 
introduced.
The Protection of Basic Services Project implemented by the Government of 
Ethiopia introduced a pilot project in 2008/09 to introduce social accountability 
mechanisms in local service delivery. It used a number of tools, including citizen 
report cards, community score cards, and participatory budgeting. An independent 
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evaluation of the pilot project considers community score cards especially effective 
in soliciting user feedback and joint deliberations (Taddesse et al. 2010). It allowed 
bringing together citizens and service providers to assess the quality, equity, and 
effectiveness of basic services in the education, health, water/sanitation, and 
agriculture sectors. The project evaluation documented evidence of improved service 
delivery outcomes as a result of the implementation of service improvement action 
plans.
Table 5 summarizes the main strengths and weaknesses of participatory 
performance monitoring as well as conditions required for its successful 
implementation and outcomes.
Table 5. Strengths and Weaknesses of Participatory Performance Monitoring
Strengths Weaknesses Conditions for success
Provides institutional channels for 
claiming legal and program-based 
rights and influencing service delivery
Increases awareness of citizens of 
their rights and mobilizes citizens for 
collective action
Improves service delivery 
performance and quality by 
generating user perspectives and 
promoting engagement with service 
providers 
Increases user awareness of service 
standards and actual delivery 
outcomes
Generates feedback from a large 
number of beneficiaries and has 
a strong potential to stimulate 
change
Community score cards and social 
audits are more participatory and can 
result in greater empowerment
Does not directly promote individual 
rights and address individual 
grievances 
Outcomes of participatory monitoring 
may not be effective without the 
willingness to penalize illegal activities 
and offer redress
Citizen report cards require financial 
resources and technical capacity to 
design and implement surveys
Community score cards and social 
audits require significant financial 
and time investment in community 
outreach and mobilization
Citizen report cards do not provide 
forums for direct engagement with 
service providers 
Threat of credible sanctions and 
provisions for horizontal accountability
Sufficient financial and technical 
capacity to design and implement 
community surveys
Resources and capacity to carry out 
effective community outreach and 
mobilization
Effective information dissemination 
and widespread media coverage
Successful citizen mobilization to 
engage with service providers and 
government agencies and make 
claims
Support of government officials and 
service providers
Sufficient institutional capacity and 
resources to ensure adequate service 
delivery
Source: Babajanian (2013).
Community Participation and Community-Driven Development
Another potentially important category of social accountability is that of user groups’ 
coming together and participating in service delivery. There has been extensive and 
growing use of this in many developing countries. There are two main modalities of 
participatory development: community-based development and local decentralization. 
A recent review of nearly 500 different studies on participatory development by 
Mansuri and Rao (2012) suggests that the key to success is the distinction between 
“organic” participation (participation spurred by civic groups) and “induced” or 
mandated participation (efforts to promote participation by the state). Further, the 
success of both types of participation is dependent on local capacity—the capacity 
for collective action.
Community participation typically addresses two major barriers to empowering 
citizens vis-à-vis the state and public service providers: the (i) lack of information about 
what constitutes an adequate level of public service, and (ii) lack of coordination and 
participation in monitoring may prevent the citizen-clients to use “voice.” To address 
these two barriers and to encourage community participation and connect providers 
with clients, a randomized intervention around community-based monitoring of 
health care providers in Uganda involved village participants and staff from local 
NGOs to act as facilitators (Bjorkman and Svensson 2009). Among 50 public rural 
health dispensaries chosen across Uganda, the authors randomly assigned half of 
the centers to receive the intervention, while the remaining half served as the control 
group. Through discussion of the issues and possible ways to improve health care 
provision, the participants agreed on a shared plan, outlining agreements about 
improvements and a monitoring plan. Bjorkman and Svensson (2009) found that 
treatment communities were significantly more involved in the monitoring of the 
providers. Consequently, health workers exerted more effort. Utilization rates in 
facilities with community monitoring increased by 20% and health outcomes, as 
measured by child birth weight and child mortality, improved substantially 1 year after 
the intervention. The results are consistently positive across a wide range of outcomes: 
immunization rates were higher, waiting times decreased, and absenteeism declined.
One often neglected aspect in generating bottom–up decisions through 
community meetings, however, is who actually decides to attend these meetings. 
Olken (2007), for example, illustrated a case of social norms as a constraint in rural 
Indonesia, where it is considered rude (particularly among the poor) to attend a 
village meeting without formal invitation. A general concern of community meetings 
is the possibility of elite capture. A natural alternative to community meetings, where 
village-level decisions are delegated to participants of the meetings, is the use of 
direct voting (or a plebiscite) as it allows a greater number of individuals to participate 
in the decision making process. Olken (2010) provided evidence from an experiment 
in Indonesia that allows for a comparison between representative-based meetings 
and election-based plebiscites. The experiment was conducted in 2005–2006 in 
49 Indonesian villages that could apply for general and women-oriented infrastructure 
projects of the Indonesian Kecamatan Development Program (KDP). 
 
The results suggest that plebiscites, as a tool of direct participation in political 
decision making, can substantially increase satisfaction and the legitimacy of policies. 
While the final choice of the project to be implemented did not change significantly 
for the general project, “women projects” selected under the plebiscite were more 
likely to be located in poorer hamlets. This could be explained by the case that, 
under the community decision-making process, women from poorer hamlets were 
less likely to be involved and hence underrepresented. Despite the positive evidence, 
however, even plebiscites are prone to elite capture, when turnout rates are not 
uniform across the population. For the Indonesian case, turnout was relatively high, 
at 79% on average. Compared to community-meeting decision making, this implies 
that 20 times more people were involved in making decisions about the KDP projects. 
Enabling citizen-clients to directly vote for the projects, therefore, appears to increase 
greatly the legitimacy of the projects ultimately chosen.
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Social Funds. Social funds or social investment funds are one of the main community-
driven development (CDD) models that have an independent legal status and are 
outside the government. These funds provide grant financing for small-scale projects 
for construction and rehabilitation of essential social and economic infrastructure, 
including schools, clinics, irrigation systems, water supply and sanitation, roads, and 
communal areas. The projects are generated and managed by local agents to enhance 
their ability to support service delivery using community-based, participatory methods, 
and competitive procurement procedures. Community groups’ control over resources 
and decision making plays a central role in the initiation, design and implementation, 
operation and maintenance, and monitoring and evaluation of the projects. The social 
funds’ bottom–up model can enable citizens to (i) influence both service delivery 
priorities, and (ii) improve service delivery quality. Community participation allows 
demand-driven micro-project selection and prioritization. Delegation of procurement 
and financial management are crucial for promoting local control (Narayan and Ebbe 
1997; De Silva and Sum 2008).
In Asia, social funds include the National Solidarity Program (NSP) in Afghanistan, 
the Armenia Social Investment Fund (ASIF), the Georgia Social Investment Fund 
(GSIF), the Village Investment Project (VIP) in the Kyrgyz Republic, the National Social 
Investment Fund in Tajikistan (NSIFT), KALAHI-CIDSS in the Philippines, PNPM in 
Indonesia, the Poverty Reduction Fund (PRF) in the Lao PDR, and the Nepal Poverty 
Alleviation Fund. In order to enable citizens to hold their leaders accountable, social 
funds introduce a number of requirements for transparent information dissemination. 
For example, the VIP in the Kyrgyz Republic requires that all micro-project budgets and 
actual costs be posted on public bulletin boards and progress be regularly reported to 
the community (Babajanian 2009).
By contrast, the awareness campaigns did lead to volunteers being trained 
and working on remedial, after-school education with significant impacts on children 
involved. Another study in Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh in India 
also provided information to communities on village education committees (VECs; 
see Pandey, Goyal, and Sundararaman 2011). This found much greater awareness 
of VECs in Karnataka than in Uttar Pradesh. The intervention led to significant 
gains in teacher attendance, the functioning of VECs, and math scores. In Armenia, 
communities with effective leaders—who had strong leadership skills and who were 
committed to their communities—were more successful in obtaining micro-project 
funds and effectively managing micro-projects (Babajanian 2005). The findings of a 
qualitative survey of KALAHI-CIDSS in the Philippines also suggest that village officials 
were instrumental in the choice of the subprojects (ADB 2012b). These case studies 
suggest that social funds serve as effective instruments for promoting community 
participation in planning and prioritization of local infrastructure and service 
investments and in the monitoring of service delivery.  
However, not all cases tell success stories. One careful study of a district in Uttar 
Pradesh, India, conducted by the NGO Pratham found no impact on education quality 
even when linked to village-level awareness campaigns on the low quality of education 
(Banerjee et al. 2010). Similarly, Babajanian (2009) suggested that the VIP project 
in the Kyrgyz Republic ensures the demand orientation mostly by “controlling” rather 
than by “transforming” local power relations. The qualitative assessment of PNPM-
Rural suggests that the elites and activists tended to exert a strong influence over the 
micro-project prioritization and proposal generation. It notes that the influence of the 
marginalized groups,10 including female-headed households and household heads 
with no primary education in the decision-making processes, was minimal (Syukri, 
Mawardi, and Akhmadi 2010; Akatiga 2010). This can be partly explained by the 
insufficient capacity of outreach workers and inadequate processes of community 
mobilization. 
Leadership skills, formal authority, and informal influence of community leaders 
are important attributes that enhance the capacity of community groups to comply 
with the social fund requirements. This however implies that communities with weak 
leadership capacity can be less successful in initiating social fund interventions 
and benefit from the capacity building exercises they offer. Another downside is that 
strong leaders may exercise top–down control, dominate participatory processes, and 
stifle community voice and initiative. Social funds are also prone to “elite capture,” 
in which powerful individuals may dominate the participatory processes and exclude 
those who do not belong to their class. Informal relations based on patronage 
represent an obstacle to claiming and exercising citizenship rights and reproduce 
social inequalities (Kabeer 2002: 23). A challenge therefore is how to ensure that the 
poorest and marginalized participate and promote their interests since communities 
are composed of diverse individuals, with different degrees of control over and access 
to economic resources and modes of production (Chambers 1997: 183–187; Cleaver 
2001: 44–45).
Table 6 summarizes the main strengths and weaknesses of community 
participation and community-driven development as well as conditions required for 
their successful implementation and outcomes.
Table 6. Strengths and Weaknesses of Community Participation and Community-Driven Development
Strengths Weaknesses Conditions for success
 
Provide institutional channels for 
citizen participation in planning, 
prioritization, implementation, and 
monitoring
Promote demand-driven service 
delivery
Enable citizens to influence service 
delivery quality
Promote accountability and 
transparency in service delivery
Use community-driven development 
bottom–up model for institutionalizing 
citizen participation in local 
governance 
 
Communities with weak leadership 
capacity may be less effective in 
attracting funds and benefiting from 
social funds
Marginalized citizens may not be willing 
and able to participate and articulate 
demands for services
May be prone to elite capture in 
environments with high levels of 
corruption and clienteles
Limited evidence about the potential 
to institutionalize citizen participation 
and improve governance outside micro-
projects
 
Conduct effective information and community 
outreach to promote meaningful participation 
and social inclusion
Incorporate rules and procedures to ensure 
inclusion of diverse social groups
Invest in the capacity building of outreach 
workers and facilitators
Promote community participation in local 
decision making and establish close 
supervision to prevent elite capture
Establish formal requirements for citizen 
participation in the governance sphere and 
carry out broader governance reforms
Source: Babajanian (2013).
10 Marginalized groups are defined in the context of PNPM as those with limited assets, living in 
peripheral areas with limited basic infrastructure, having limited income with a large number of 
dependents, and originating from an ethnic or religious minority (Akatiga 2010: 3).
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State versus Private Provisioning
There is little doubt that empowerment—via the various mechanisms discussed in the 
previous section—increases the accountability of public service providers to citizens 
and communities, and puts pressure on providers to improve their performance in 
service delivery. Clearly, the ability of empowerment to improve service delivery will 
depend on complementary changes in the workings of state institutions, including 
the bureaucracy, the political process, the judiciary, and the frontline providers. It is 
certainly plausible to envisage a situation where these institutions remain resilient—
and impervious—to increased accountability pressures. But, in the final analysis, how 
far should the state go in directly providing services to empowered citizens?
Role of the State
The provisioning of basic services, such as water, sanitation, and primary education, 
cannot be left to the market alone since these services have the characteristics of 
public goods. In other words, these services have significant positive externalities 
and are typically non-excludable. So, for instance, vaccination against measles and 
polio has a large health benefit beyond that to the child being vaccinated, and it is 
impossible to exclude any person from enjoying the benefits of pollution control (i.e., 
clean air). This market failure is the classic argument for state intervention; services 
like immunization and pollution control will be under-provisioned by the private sector 
because people have an incentive to free ride on the provision of others. The state 
therefore needs to provide these services to generate maximum social welfare.
There is another class of public services that typically have to be either provided 
or regulated by governments because competitive markets do not exist for these 
services. Public utilities, such as gas, water, and electricity, fall in this category; they 
are often natural monopolies because the infrastructure required to produce and 
deliver a product such as electricity or water is expensive to build and maintain. 
Consequently, they are provided by government monopolies or are extensively 
regulated by governments.11 
Finally, some public services, such as subsidized housing, need-based student 
scholarships, supplemental income transfers, and family planning services, are 
provided by governments as means of redressing economic inequality and achieving 
social goals, such as poverty alleviation and population control. Typically, there would 
be little incentive for private providers to provide such services, unless they are 
contracted (and paid) by the government to provide them.
While there is a strong case for governments to take responsibility for some 
essential services, many Asian governments are constrained by lack of fiscal 
resources. In fact, in several countries, essential public services are already 
contracted out for delivery to private providers and NGOs that provide microcredit, 
health, sanitation, and education services. Especially NGOs usually have a wider 
reach than government providers and often cater to marginalized communities in 
difficult-to-reach regions. Contracting with them to supply social services on behalf of 
11 Recent developments in technology have somewhat weakened the natural monopoly argument for 
utilities, and, in many countries, services such as electricity generation and transmission, telecom-
munication, and postal services have become competitive.
the government may result in greater population access. The poor in developing Asian 
economies often prefer private and NGO providers to state providers. Additionally, 
since private providers bear more demand risk than public providers, they are more 
vulnerable to sanctions from consumers and thus have a stronger incentive to be 
more responsive to consumer needs and concerns, reflecting client power. Finally, 
in many cases, nongovernment providers have a lower cost of service delivery than 
government providers, thus permitting provision of more services within a given 
service delivery budget (Bräutigam and Segarra 2007; Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 
2002, 2011; Feiock and Jang 2009; Joshi and Moore 2004; Mcloughlin 2011).
An example of a successful partnership between key stakeholders, including 
NGOs, the government at all levels, corporations, and citizens is Pratham, an NGO 
established by Amartya Sen, which works in the area of elementary education in 
India and gender inequality in Bangladesh. The four largest NGOs in Bangladesh that 
extend microfinance services have about 14.2 million borrowers. NGOs and other 
voluntary associations are equally widespread and important in other countries in the 
region, including the Philippines. 
Public–Private Partnerships
A hybrid model is a public–private partnership (PPP), a system under which public 
services are funded and operated through a partnership between the government 
and a private company or citizen-based organization. Contracting is a type of PPP. 
With careful design and management, contracting can often improve the quantity 
and quality of public services. 
There are three important considerations in selecting and implementing a PPP. 
First, it is important for a government to match a provider—whether a private company 
or an NGO—with the specific service being contracted out, based on the comparative 
advantage of the provider and the nature of the service (i.e., provision of a public good, 
private good, or both to a target population). For instance, the possibility of charging user 
fees for private goods will appeal to for-profit firms, while greater importance of social 
or equity goals in the delivery of public goods or private goods will appeal to NGOs.12 
The second step is to motivate the private or NGO provider whose goals or 
preferred ways of achieving them are not necessarily identical to that of the state 
agency. In general, the prescribed incentive scheme is to tie payments for services 
to performance. In these so-called high-powered incentive schemes, the firm will be 
motivated to expend efforts toward the desired outcome of the partnership. In the 
extreme, the firm could be made the residual claimant, that is, the party that absorbs 
the net revenues or losses. There is an important caveat to this prescribed rule though. 
The matching of non-state providers to the public service being contracted out as 
well as the choice of incentive mechanism appropriate to the PPP is summarized in 
Figure 21.
12 For example, the Pratichi Trust, founded by Amartya Sen, is an NGO that is committed to inclusive and 
effective development, especially by tackling illiteracy and poor education, child nutrition, the lack of 
basic affordable health care, and the disadvantages faced by women and young girls in many states 
of India.
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Figure 21. Service Delivery Mechanisms
Example: Infrastructure (airports or superhighways)
Delivery mechanism: Privatization to public–private
partnership (with for-profit firms)
Incentives: Free for services with regulation;
variants of build–operate–transfer schemes or
joint ventures, concessions (depending on the
required capital investment and tolerance for risks)
Examples: National defense, monetary policy,
foreign affairs
Delivery mechanism: Pure public provision-
required investment is high; government valuation
is higher than private value; possibility of hold up;
Incentives or motivational factors: Electoral
incentives; career concerns, promotion, public 
recognition, morale, ethics
Examples: Local mangrove or forest protection;
parks, and recreation
Delivery mechanism: Pure public provision;
co-provision with NGOs
Incentives or motivational factors: Electoral
incentives, career concerns; mission-oriented 
advocacies; cost-sharing
high
low
National
Local
Coverage
public good
Public
service
private good
Priority on equity
Example: Small-scale utilities (water and
sewerage), personal health care services
Delivery mechanism: Pure public or public–NGO
provision
Incentives or motivational factors: Low-powered
incentives in the public sector; cost-sharing with
NGO 
NGO = nongovernment organization.
Source: Capuno (2013).
If social objectives—like targeting the poor—or the quality of the private good 
are more important than the quantity supplied to the target population, then making 
the private firm the residual claimant will not serve the purpose. This is because the 
private entrepreneur will skimp on costs at the expense of quality or concentrate 
toward paying clients. Thus, depending on how the state agency defines the success 
of the project (i.e., relative weight between social objectives and mere quantity 
provisioning), “residual claims should be given to the party whose investment is more 
important to the success of the project.”
Thus, in typical PPPs for large infrastructure projects, the private contractor 
may be allowed to build, operate, or lease the project over a period of time, during 
which it collects fees, depending on the state’s capacity to raise capital and tolerance 
for risks.13 The partnership can make allowances for social objectives as part of the 
private firm’s corporate social responsibility or by building it directly into the firm’s 
allowable rate of return on its investments. 
In small-scale infrastructure projects or when the social objectives are more 
important, the state agency can partner with nonprofit firms. Since these firms are 
normally mission-oriented, monetary incentives are less needed. They will participate 
13 The state presumably weighs these financial costs against the possible social costs of temporarily 
“privatizing” the ownership or operation of the infrastructure project.
in public projects that are aligned with their advocacies, such as catering to the needs 
of marginalized groups (poor, women and children, ethnic minorities, senior citizens, 
or persons with disabilities), or certain causes (e.g., environmental protection, human 
rights, preservation of indigenous or endangered plants and animals). Unlike for-profit 
firms, NGOs usually do not require payments for their inputs or services and do so 
only to defray part of their costs and not to earn profits.
Government–NGO partnership could also work in the provision of public goods, 
especially local public goods. In the provision of these goods, there is no residual 
claimant, and therefore it is less attractive to private for-profit firms. These services 
are usually provided free of charge or for a minimal fee. Moreover, whatever revenues 
are generated usually become part of the state agency’s general fund (or go to 
the state treasury), which may or may not then be allocated to the provision of the 
contracted service. Since local public goods have only limited service coverage (or 
beneficiaries), they can be targeted to specific groups. If these goods are targeted to 
the poor or other marginalized groups, then NGO delivery seems appropriate. 
The third issue is that of regulation. The argument is often made that non-state 
providers are under-regulated, since they do not fall under the purview of strict rules 
and regulations that public providers have to follow. This is especially the case in 
countries with weak state capacity, lack of information, and poor dialogue between 
the state and non-state providers. The regulation issue needs to be addressed in 
a binding contract that explicitly states the minimum standards of quality that will 
be provided by the non-state provider. Since all possible contingencies that might 
arise cannot be anticipated in advance, conflicts between the state and the non-
state provider are inevitable. There should also be a clear process for arbitrating and 
resolving such conflicts.
The following four case studies of PPP from developing Asia highlight the three 
considerations discussed earlier. They highlight how governments can significantly 
improve service delivery by carefully choosing non-state providers for particular tasks 
and tailoring an appropriate service delivery agreement with them.
Case Studies 
Nongovernment Organization Management of Public Primary 
Health Care Centers in Karnataka, India
A case of successful government–NGO partnership in the delivery of basis services is 
between the Karuna Trust and the Department of Health and Family Welfare (DHFW) 
of the Government of Karnataka, a state in India. Established as a public charitable 
trust in 1986 by a public-spirited doctor, the trust initially concentrated on the control 
of leprosy among ethnic populations in the poor areas of Chamrajnaggar District in 
Karnataka. Its immersion in the tribal areas convinced it to expand its delivery of 
health services to include tuberculosis control and to support local government-run 
primary health centers (PHCs). Recognizing that it could do more to provide better 
health services because of staff availability, proximity, and close relationship with 
the service clients, the trust wanted to manage some of the government’s PHCs. 
An opportunity presented itself under a World Bank population project that awarded 
grants to NGOs to run PHCs on an experimental basis. In 1996, the DHFW approved 
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the Trust’s proposal to manage the PHCs in two districts. For its part, the DHFW saw 
some benefits in the arrangement. It enabled the government to address its problem 
of managing far-away PHCs and assigning health staff to these facilities. The staffing 
difficulty was partly due to restrictions then in the government recruitment practice 
(apparently, only once in 5 or 6 years). In contrast, the trust had greater flexibility in 
hiring doctors. For its part, the trust’s director at the time recognized that there was 
no need to run parallel services with the public sector, especially when it became 
increasingly difficult to raise funds from private individuals and donors. Despite its 
own budget constraints, the trust opted for cost sharing in its partnership with the 
government to keep its independence and not compromise on issues of “equity, 
integrity, and quality.”
While the arrangement perfectly matched the mission-oriented Karuna Trust 
with the delivery of a local public health service within its competence, it secured 
the motivation of the partners as well. For an initial period of 5 years, the trust was 
entrusted with the care, operation, and management of the PHCs. The contract 
further stipulated that the trust will perform tasks consistent with national and state 
program mandates. The trust was also responsible for appointing its own staff subject 
to the approval of the DHFW. For its part, the state government committed to provide 
50% of the management costs, while the World Bank project provided new pieces of 
furniture. In addition, the local zilla panchayat (a local government body at the district 
level) provided a grant-in-aid to cover 90% of the operating budget, while the trust 
shouldered the remaining 10%. The grant was reduced proportionally to the amount 
of the drugs supplied to the PHCs by the local governments. These are some of the 
key features of the partnership.
The initial partnership became so successful that in June 2003 the Karuna 
Trust was entrusted to manage two more PHCs. By 2007, it was already administering 
23 PHCs, 2 primary health units, and 2 clinics across Karnataka. The success of this 
arrangement between the trust and the DHFW laid the foundation for a new policy 
on public–NGO partnerships in Karnataka state. The new scheme permits NGOs and 
other charitable institutions as well as private medical colleges to fully administer or 
coadminister PHCs. The new contract stipulated a 75%–25% cost sharing between 
the state and the private sector partner.
Clearly, in this case, there was a mutual codependence in both the partners’ 
objectives and a mutual agreement in the means to achieve them. In pursuing 
its mission, the Karuna Trust also ended up in a position where it can influence 
important public services targeted to marginalized groups (tribal population). Since 
the partnership’s objectives were aligned with the trust’s own advocacy, it was willing 
to bring in additional resources to improve both the PHC’s physical setup and services. 
Arguably, the same gesture increased the credibility of the trust with the government, 
which together with the fact the local officials can easily observe or verify the trust’s 
activities, rendered the need for monitoring less critical.
There were two main factors that made the partnership possible and successful. 
First, there was willingness on the part of the state government, especially the DHFW, 
to work with NGOs. This willingness enabled the Karuna Trust and the DHFW to try 
and carve out a special arrangement. Second, the trust director had a great deal 
of credibility and influence in his membership in various state- and national-level 
commissions and committees, where he was able to advocate for increased PPPs. 
Contracting for Health Services in Cambodia
When the Cambodian government in 1999 first tried on an experimental basis to 
contract out the management of government health services to NGOs, the country 
was facing a severe service delivery capacity. To get around this constraint, the 
Ministry of Health tendered a bid to provide a minimum package of health services 
(including preventive, promotional, and simple curative health care services) in 
selected districts. To see whether such an arrangement would work and under what 
conditions, the government specified the performance measures and the incentives 
to be used. The performance measures included service delivery coverage indicators, 
including antenatal care, facility delivery, child immunization, receipt of vitamin A 
capsules, family planning awareness, and contraceptive prevalence rates. Additional 
outcome indicators were also employed, including health facility management, such 
as 24-hour service at the health center, staffing, maternal delivery services, and 
collection and transparency of user fees.
Since the government unilaterally specified these performance and outcome 
indicators, there was no assurance of a buy-in among the winning bidders, 
which were all NGOs. To motivate these private sector partners, the government 
tendered two types of management contracts. Under the first type of contract, 
the NGO contractor was engaged to provide administrative assistance only to the 
government health staff stationed in the concerned health facilities. In exchange, 
the government provided NGOs’ operating budgets in the same manner as ordinary 
districts. These contractors were granted an additional budget supplement 
amounting to $0.25 per patient out of the loan funds (from multilateral institutions). 
In this setup, the contractors had full management control over the allocations and 
disbursement of their budgets but had to follow existing government system for 
the procurement of drugs, equipment, and supplies using public funds. Under the 
second type of contract, the NGO partners had the same tasks and responsibilities 
as those under the first type of contracts; in addition, though, the NGOs under the 
second type of contract had the prerogative to directly employ their own staff.14 
To tease out the effects of different contractual arrangements on health performance 
and outcome indicators, the contracts were randomly introduced in 8 of 12 
selected districts in the country, with the remaining four districts as controls (where 
the government continued to administer the local health services). The project 
was implemented from 1999 to 2003 and covered about 1.26 million people, 
approximately 11% of Cambodia’s population. An impact evaluation showed that the 
targeted service outcomes in the treatment districts were better than those in the 
control areas, which indicate that NGOs had indeed some comparative advantage 
over the government in the delivery of basic health services to some population 
groups. More interestingly, however, the evaluation also showed that districts where 
greater managerial autonomy was granted to NGOs showed greater improvements in 
terms of health center management. This result suggests that, if given the leeway, a 
mission-oriented private sector partner will even find a better way to deliver the same 
results. In addition to the desirable supply-side impacts, the intervention also led to 
reductions in private health expenditures. All these results only show that there is 
room for experimenting with various incentives schemes even if potential partners 
are appropriately matched with service delivery required. 
14 The existing government health staff at the time could either join the contractor’s organization (with 
the latter’s concurrence) and take a leave of absence from government services or be transferred to 
another government in another district.
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What differentiates the contracts between the Karuna Trust and the DHFW in 
Karnataka and the NGOs and the Government of Cambodia is the stricter contractual 
obligations of the NGOs in the latter. This is understandable since NGO partners 
in Cambodia had to follow stricter protocols and deliver certain results under the 
experimental setup. These strictures included hiring existing health staff presumably 
at civil service rates, which could be higher than if the NGO partners were to hire 
on their own terms. In the case of the Karuna Trust in Karnataka, however, the 
NGO is known to hire doctors and health staff at lower-than-government rates, 
which unfortunately led to faster turnover of its personnel. Thus, while the NGOs in 
Cambodia were matched to the type of services within their competence (local health 
services), they had less flexibility in the ways to deliver these services, which could 
be costly. Monetary support from the government was perhaps necessary to entice 
then to participate. 
Microfinance and Nongovernment Organizations in Nepal
Whereas the two case studies reviewed underscore the importance of an enabling 
environment and the government’s openness to work with NGOs, the third case study 
depicts exactly the opposite. In Nepal, the government was interested in expanding 
credit access by extending it to the rural population. At the same time, NGOs had 
the latent capacity to help service this particular need of the poor households in 
the country. Instead of adopting an alternative service delivery mechanism, the 
government instituted regulations that inadvertently foiled potential matches between 
private microcredit providers and household borrowers.
To widen private sector participation in providing microfinance services, the 
Government of Nepal in 1992 established two banks patterned after the famous 
Grameen Bank model in Bangladesh. In addition, the country’s central bank issued 
a directive requiring commercial banks to set aside 3% of their total loans for poor, 
marginalized borrowers. Although 17 commercial banks complied with this directive, 
the country only had limited success in widening the access of the poor to microcredit 
facilities and in promoting small-scale business enterprises in the rural areas.
Relative to the government banks, NGOs appeared to have a cost advantage 
in extending microfinance services. Since they use volunteer workers, they can 
operate at lower costs. In contrast, government banks rely on salaried employees. 
This required them to operate at sufficient scale to reduce their average costs (per 
borrower), which was difficult to achieve in low-density areas where many of the target 
clients resided. The then Maoist insurgency in the country aggravated the problem. 
State-owned regional banks and private microfinance institutions and private banks 
were unable to penetrate conflict areas. Compared to these financial firms, NGOs 
are less of a target by Maoists rebels, which arguably makes them viable conduits 
of microcredit to the target population. The experience of Nepal offers a lesson in 
engaging private sector providers for their comparative advantage, which is their 
presence in hard-to-reach areas.
Water Service Delivery to the Poor  in Metro Manila, Philippines
The final case study involves the delivery of a private good, achieved through 
privatization, but with an important equity component, achieved in partnership with 
NGOs. While the service delivery mechanism is essentially between the state and a 
for-profit firm, the engagement of an NGO in this case only shows that partnerships 
need not be purely bilateral.
In 1997, the government privatized the operation of the Metropolitan 
Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS). The privatization was undertaken to 
meet the increasing demand for water and sewerage services of a rapidly expanding 
population in Metro Manila. Two firms won in separate competitive bids and were 
each awarded a 25-year concession agreement. Each company was a consortium of 
some of the most successful private corporations engaged in many industries in the 
country and some equally competent foreign firms. 
Since water and sewage services are essentially private goods, the winning 
concessionaires were allowed to charge user fees to recover their investments and 
operating costs and earn some profits. In particular, they were allowed to petition for 
rate adjustments based on inflation, extraordinary circumstances, and rebasing. They 
were also granted a 6-year tax holiday, preferential tariffs of 3% on imported capital 
equipment, and tax credits on locally produced capital equipment until end of 1997. 
In addition, they were exempted from paying local government and franchise taxes, 
and the value-added tax on the supply and distribution of water. 
In turn, the concessionaires were mandated to supply water for 24 hours 
every day to all connections no later than June 2000 and keep a satisfactory water 
quality for drinking and other purposes. In addition, the private firms were required to 
maintain minimum equity investments (amounting to 20% in the first 5 years), post 
performance bonds, and pay other fees to the government. For the initial years of 
operation, the concessionaires were permitted to collect water and sewer charges 
based on their bid prices.
Apparently, given the incentives under the agreement, the concessionaires 
proved up to the task. Reportedly, Metro Manila following the privatization had 
achieved the lowest water rates in the Philippines and in the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region. Despite initial financial difficulties, 
the two concessionaires then appeared poised to recover their losses.15 
 They both were able to reduce their so-called non-revenue water from leaks, illegal 
taps, metering errors, and nonpayment of service connections. Reputedly, most of 
the non-revenue water was lost in the slum, poor areas in Metro Manila.
To address this particular problem and at the same time continue to cater to 
the needs of the depressed communities, one of the companies shifted from its initial 
strategy of providing a standpipe to serve a group of households to another strategy 
of providing individual household connections. From the company’s perspective, the 
“Water for Community” program made sense, since it facilitated the payment for 
water consumption. To entice more households to get their own water connections, 
the company waived its land title requirement that many of the urban dwellers failed 
15 However, later events show that Maynilad Water Services had to sell its concession contract to an-
other firm.
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to satisfy. To make the cost of connection within reach, it further allowed households 
to pay for their water connections on staggered basis over a period of 6–12 months 
and to be added to their regular monthly bills.
In the rollout of the “Water for Community” program, the company saw the need 
to engage several NGOs to serve as social intermediaries between it and the relevant 
communities. These NGOs first undertook information and education campaigns. A 
foreign NGO (Médecins Sans Frontières) was tapped to help improve the sanitary 
conditions in the slum areas by encouraging community participation. In Malabon 
City, a local NGO (Lingkuran sa Ikauunlad na Ganap ng Pamilya Foundation, or 
LINGaP) was also engaged to assist in the sanitation and health education drives in 
the urban poor communities.
The parties all contributed their own resources to the undertaking. The local 
NGO provided transport and materials, while the community (through its homeowners 
association) provided free labor as well as storage and security for the materials, 
tools, and equipment used. The company provided the individual water connections, 
while the city government contributed a total of P600,000 to procure materials for 
the drainage system and other logistics support.
The partnership that carried out the “Water for Community” program proved 
successful. More households benefited through their increased water consumption. 
Feedback from focus group discussions reveal that many of the newly connected 
households claimed to have been empowered and become “legitimate part of society.” 
For the company, the project made business sense as its revenues increased with the 
water consumption and could be considered as good corporate social responsibility.
What this last case study reveals is again the potential gains that can be realized 
from alternative service mechanisms, and the suitability of incentives schemes to the 
types of service delivery partner engaged in the process. The provision of the water 
and sewer services in a metropolitan area is rightly assigned to a private firm, which 
has greater access to the required financial investments and technical resources, 
with the right to charge user fees that most households will be willing to pay for 
the water connection and for the actual water they consume. The needs of the poor 
households, as shown in this case, need not be sacrificed. They can be connected 
to the water system with the help of NGOs and local governments, who presumably 
are both motivated to support the poor households. By engaging the latter in a very 
particular activity (water connection), the experience has shown that privatization of 
a water utility still has room for other service delivery mechanisms.
Information and Communication 
Technology
The previous sections presented a case for leveraging the private sector, but there 
is one downside to the contracting out of public services to non-state providers. 
Sometimes, the exit from state provisioning of basic services can reduce the broader 
pressure for tackling bureaucratic and organizational performance issues in the 
public sector. This exit is partly driven by people’s choice (notably in education 
and health, where rising incomes create a preference for non-state providers), but 
also by political and bureaucratic leaders, where PPP is seen as a solution to the 
weaknesses of the state. This fails to take account of the frequent need for more 
effective state regulation—and associated accountability mechanisms—in both social 
and infrastructural services. Information and communication technology (ICT) has 
emerged, in the last two decades, as a powerful tool for improving internal efficiency 
in government functioning, and thereby mediating the influence of empowerment on 
service delivery. ICT can facilitate citizen and community empowerment, for example, 
by permitting easy access to information on the performance of service providers 
on the budgets and workings of government, and making it easier to monitor them. 
It can also directly improve the delivery of services by encouraging transparency 
and accountability, cutting intermediaries, streamlining procedures, and increasing 
delivery efficiencies. 
Improving Service Provision through ICT
“… given the nature of poverty in India as well as the nature of available technology, 
it was not unreasonable in 1947 (when India became independent) to concentrate 
on elementary education, basic health, and so on, and to not worry too much about 
whether everyone can effectively communicate across the country and beyond. 
However, with the development of the internet and its wide-ranging applications, and 
the advance made in information technology (not least in India), access to the web 
and the freedom of general communication has become a very important capability 
that is of interest and relevance to all Indians” (Sen 2005:159).
Many governments are using ICT for improved delivery of services, 
for example, ensuring property rights and connecting the poor to markets 
to lower their transaction costs (Bhatnagar and Singh 2010; Bhatnagar 
2009a). Several countries in Asia are home to a large number of experiments 
in the use of ICT for sustainable development. These initiatives have been 
launched by governments, private enterprises, civil society, and cooperatives.16 
However, very few of these experiments have been scaled up to national levels, 
which is why the impact of such experiments on the broader society still remains 
modest. However, there is significant promise in the ability of ICT to improve service 
delivery. What is needed is for policy makers to identify scalable initiatives and design 
institutional mechanisms that can help in wider replication of successful experiments.
16 See UNESCO’s Solution Exchange for ICT for Development Community in India.
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ICT can be used in diverse applications to accelerate information dissemination, to 
improve efficiency of public services, to increase the transparency and accountability of 
government administration, to reduce corruption, and to facilitate citizen participation 
in local governance.17
Figure 22 presents four different types of these applications and the outcomes 
that can be achieved from them.
Figure 22. Different Types of Information and Communication Technology 
Applications for Rural Poor
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The first type of application consists of ICT interventions in an existing program of 
delivering public services (e.g., in health care delivery). For instance, in a pilot project in 
the Indian state of Karnataka, beneficiaries are given smart cards that hold their personal 
information and allow instant updating, upon delivery of a service, through the use of 
a hand-held device by the field workers. The Management Information System reports 
generated by the workers in the new system are based on beneficiaries saying they have 
received a service rather than a worker saying that service was delivered. The local 
public health officials are better able to monitor service delivery, evaluate beneficiary 
experience, identify service delivery gaps, and respond promptly to concerns such as 
supply shortages, lack of community involvement, and needs for further training.18 
17 For some examples, see case studies on empowerment at the World Bank’s PovertyNet website and 
Bhatnagar and Schware (2000)
18 See World Bank’s Beneficiary Verification and Feedback Empowers Access to Health Services in 
Karnataka.
In the second type of application, ICTs enable electronic delivery of 
government services, such as caste and below-poverty-income certificates, to 
the rural population, thus entitling that segment of the population to subsidized 
food, fertilizer, and health services. Copies of land titles are being electronically 
delivered to facilitate access to farm loans and reduce the cost of land transactions. 
E-delivery improves access to such services and also reduces the cost of accessing 
such services (Gupta, Bagga, and Ayaluri 2010). The third type of ICT application 
involves sharing information on public expenditure at the local level to increase 
transparency of budgets and generate community involvement in public expenditure 
decisions. Similarly, information on performance of government agencies 
shared with citizens can promote community auditing of project execution19. 
The fourth type of application focuses on enhancing rural incomes by providing 
information on economic opportunities, knowledge of best practices, and current 
prices of agriculture commodities through websites, call centers, and mobile phones. 
The Government of Sri Lanka has launched a multilingual call center to make it faster 
and easier for citizens to access government services. By dialing a particular toll-free 
number from any phone, individuals can obtain information on how to replace their 
identification cards or how to get a loan facility from a government bank (Low 2009, 
Samarajiva 2012).
Examples of all four types of ICT interventions noted are discussed below. The 
projects that are described are not pilot projects; they have been launched on a large 
scale (and almost universal in some areas). Because India has been a pioneer in the 
use of ICT in service delivery, all four examples discussed are from India. 
Case Studies
Payment of Pensions and Wages through Electronic Banking
The Government of Andhra Pradesh in India has used ICT to completely revamp the 
system of payments to the elderly under the National Old Age Pension (NOAP) Scheme, 
which also covers widows and the physically handicapped.20 Under this scheme, 
monthly payments to the identified beneficiaries are made by panchayat (village 
council) functionaries. The scheme under the NREGA has also been revamped using 
end-to-end ICT solution to simplify activities, such as issuance of job cards to rural 
households, identification of work to be undertaken, generation of work estimates, 
and monitoring of work execution. All wage payments under the NREGA are made 
directly to savings bank accounts opened by workers with their nearest post office. 
Prior to this mandate, when cash payments were made, there had been reports of 
reduced wages or nonpayment of wages to workers. 
19 The website of the Ministry of Panchayati Raj has sparsely populated content on best practices.
20 This case study was commissioned by LIRNEasia (www.lirneasia.net), as a part of the “Mobile 2.0@
BOP” research project.
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The new approach in making payments represents a partnership between the 
Government of Andhra Pradesh and an NGO, Zero Mass Foundation (ZMF), which 
credits the monthly payments of rural payees to their bank accounts and facilitates 
the withdrawal of funds from the account without requiring the payees to go to a bank 
branch or a panchayat office. It was possible to implement this project because the 
Reserve Bank of India, under its Financial Inclusion Program, permitted scheduled 
banks to appoint business correspondents as bank agents who are authorized 
to open an account, and to perform deposit and withdrawal transactions from a 
beneficiary account. 
ZMF acts as the business correspondent for the six banks that have been 
assigned specific districts for the purpose of making pension and NREGA payments. 
ZMF has set up offices in every district covered under the program. In each district, 
several customer service points (CSPs) have been created by selecting women from 
the local self-help groups (SHG) who are given a kit consisting of a general packet 
radio service (GPRS)-enabled special mobile phone and accessories. These kits can 
process banking transactions such as deposits and withdrawals electronically by real-
time exchange of information with the bank’s database at the back end. Customers 
are provided banking services at a specified location within each village. The SHG 
acts as a guarantor for the member selected as the CSP.
ZMF offices handle the task of selecting and training CSPs, providing kits to 
CSPs, maintaining the kits in the field, collecting and storing enrollment forms and 
data entry of information entered in the forms, and liaising with the local bank branch 
for withdrawal of cash for disbursement, deposit of excess cash after disbursement, 
and movement of cash from the bank branches to the CSPs.
Once the list of eligible beneficiaries is made available to the banks, enrollment 
camps are conducted in villages by a team consisting of employees of the bank, ZMF, 
and local government functionaries. Five fingerprints, a photo, and other personal 
details of the beneficiary are captured. The enrollment data are stored on the mobile 
phone and later downloaded to the servers of ZMF through a GPRS service. The data 
from the forms are digitized and transferred to the concerned bank’s central branch 
in textual form as an electronic file. The central bank server passes the data to the 
link branch with the validated data of beneficiaries. The bank branch reviews the data 
and authorizes the opening of an account, which takes about 3 weeks. 
The CSP is required to complete a biometric log-in by scanning fingerprints 
through the fingerprint reader, prior to starting transactions in a session. The CSP’s 
mobile phone has the details of the beneficiaries’ accounts. When a beneficiary 
comes to withdraw money, an index fingerprint is captured on the biometric device. 
The device also pulls up the stored photo of the beneficiary. The CSPs generate a 
receipt in duplicate. ZMF operates in 127 districts across 26 states in India with nearly 
6,000 CSPs serving a total of 1.5 million NREGA payees, and 0.7 million pensioners. 
The project demonstrates the potential of using GPRS-enabled mobile phones 
with a low initial investment, low operating cost, not requiring regular electric supply, 
easy maintenance, and easy-to-learn operations. The project delivers services that 
offer greater convenience to pensioners and are free of bribes. The government saves 
nearly 30% of the pension payout every month by weeding out “ghost” pensioners.
The critical role of low-cost organizations, such as ZMF, which can support the 
operations in rural areas needs to be highlighted. In the context of using a unique 
identification number (UID) for authenticating the beneficiary, the policy makers ought 
to have recognized the need for institutions like ZMF to open accounts and operate 
the cash subsidy scheme that has been announced by the Government of India.21 
Clearly, efforts to learn from existing successes by those who float technology-related 
initiatives to help the poor are weak. In fact, the ZMF experiment almost collapsed in 
2010 because the fee reimbursed per transaction to ZMF was not financially viable. 
Computerized Management of Land Records
Nearly 15 states in India have implemented an e-governance project called Bhoomi 
(meaning land) to manage land records and issue copies of ownership records. 
The record of land ownership document is required for obtaining crop loans from 
banks. The Bhoomi service is already used by millions of rural landowners. A study 
commissioned by the Department of Information Technology, Government of India, to 
ascertain the directly measurable and perceived impact on citizens of e-governance 
applications in the service delivery from seven key departments across ten states 
of India showed that computerized delivery reduced citizens’ cost of accessing such 
services by Rs100 per service transaction. A common measurement framework was 
used in the study in which the costs to the citizen of accessing a service (e.g., number 
of trips to a delivery point, waiting time at delivery point, and payment of bribes) were 
measured directly through a survey. Nearly 700 citizens distributed over 24 locations 
within a state were surveyed to capture their experience of using each service in 
manual mode and using the same service after computerization. 
The impact on key dimensions in the land record project across ten states is 
shown in Figure 23. Results indicate a poor state of delivery of services through the 
manual system. On an average, a user needs to make three to four trips to government 
offices, wait for 2 hours or more (up to 6 hours in some states) on each trip, and pay 
frequent bribes (ranging from 20% to 90% of the transaction value) to obtain the 
service. 
Figure 23 indicates that after computerization, rural landowners experienced 
significant improvement in service delivery on all three indicators. Overall, the number 
of trips to offices was reduced by 1 from an average of 2.7. Waiting time was reduced 
by 30%. In five out of ten states, there was a significant reduction in the proportion of 
transactions in which a bribe was paid, suggesting that e-governance seems to have 
the potential to reduce corruption significantly.
21 If pension payment had been replicated all over the country, use of UID to identify the beneficiary 
would have been an easy task and the scale-down of a modest plan for cash subsidies could have 
been avoided. See The Economic Times (2012).
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Figure 23. Indicators of Performance for Manual versus Computerized Services Offered 
under Bhoomi
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E-governance can help reduce corruption in a variety of ways. It takes away 
discretion from the government functionary, thereby curbing opportunities for 
corruption. For example, in land records computerization in Karnataka, a first in, first 
out (FIFO) discipline is imposed on the order of processing applications for changes 
in records in the workflow system established to handle the task. Government 
employees cannot help anyone to jump the queue. The date and time are automatically 
stamped on each service request and these requests cannot be rejected arbitrarily, 
as a reason must be recorded if an application is rejected. Biometric log-in by 
operators and audit trails make it possible to track and link any corrupt operator 
making illegitimate changes in data through wrongful acts. By making rules simple 
and more transparent, e-governance empowers citizens and businesses to question 
unreasonable rules and procedures and their arbitrary applications. Through kiosks, 
websites, and their mobile phones, citizens can check the status of their service 
request as well as highlight any errors. Unlike the traditional system, reduced physical 
contact with government officials protects low-income and disadvantaged users from 
potential bribe-seekers.
The second phase of the Bhoomi project has seen further reforms. The three 
agencies processing land transactions (the sub-registrar’s office, the revenue 
department, and the land survey department) were integrated through sharing 
of information. Any registration of a land transaction in sub-registrar’s office 
automatically triggers a mutation process in the revenue department database. In 
registering a deed, the details of owners of a land parcel are automatically picked 
up from the land record database, preventing fraudulent registration. Nearly 1,000 
cybercafes have been established by a private partner in rural areas to offer a basket 
of services including online land-related services.
Projects like Bhoomi demonstrate that well-designed ICT-enabled service 
delivery projects with process reforms that enhance transparency and accountability, 
reduce discretion vested with civil servants, and enhance efficiency can lower 
corruption. They also significantly reduce the cost associated with obtaining essential 
public services, such as land registration.
Promoting Citizen Empowerment and Engagement through 
Information Sharing
A successful example of information sharing with citizens is the initiative in the 
Indian state of Chattisgarh to involve the community in tracking pilferage of grains 
in the public distribution system. Members who register their mobile phones receive 
complete details of the truck carrying grains to their fair price shops. This information 
has helped in checking diversion of trucks (One World Foundation 2011).
Another program called e-Panchayat is being implemented under the Government 
of India’s National e-Governance Plan (NeGP). This plan focuses on computerizing 
local government functioning, so that information on development expenditure 
and performance of executing contractors can be shared with communities. This is 
expected to empower such communities to demand a fair allocation of development 
expenditure that best meets their needs (Dinoj 2009, Bhatnagar 2009b).
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However, in practice, the proportion of citizens who are willing to be regularly 
engaged with the government is typically small (Bhatnagar 2009c). Often, information-
sharing experiments fail to yield the participation of the community in the process of 
planning and monitoring of works in rural areas, unless an NGO actively mobilizes the 
community. For example, Mazdoor Kissan Sangh (MKSS), a trade union of agricultural 
workers, organized a series of combined public hearings and grievance redress 
camps in Rajasthan.22 These “Right to Hearing” camps were held in 4 panchayats to 
look at the delivery of services by 16 government departments. Government officials 
were present to receive complaints related to services/entitlements, such as health 
benefits, pensions (old age, widow, disability), NREGA, PDS, and electricity supply, 
and answer queries related to nonpayment or nondelivery of a particular service or 
entitlement.
In Rajasthan, the government has started a scheme by which the state 
departments are bound by law to receive complaints, and give dated receipts. This 
is the first important step for a grievance redress mechanism, as it represents the 
right of a person to be heard. The “Right to Hearing” camps hope to take forward 
this initiative of the government by increasing awareness about this mechanism of 
grievance redress, and to provide a public platform where there can be participation 
in holding government accountable. Such camps provide a space where immediate 
action could be taken to right actionable wrongs, correct flaws in the system, and 
charge corrupt officials. The camps are an exercise in making the system work from 
the bottom–up, creating a space where people have the individual and collective 
power to demand their rights and push the state to deliver. 
With 40 million Facebook and 16 million Twitter users in India, social media has 
emerged as a powerful platform for forming an opinion as well as for generating mass 
support in urban India. As in other countries, its visible impact as a mobilizing force 
has recently been felt in India on two occasions, both representing a confrontation 
between citizens and the government (Singh 2012). The Ministry of Communications 
and Information Technology has prepared guidelines for using social media by 
government agencies for constructive citizen engagement (DeitY 2012). Government 
agencies are likely to use social media as a means to put forth their own point of view, 
rather than to seek feedback on policy and performance.
Empowering Farmers and Fishermen:  
Sharing Knowledge and Price Information
In much of developing Asia, mobile phones are playing a significant role in trade 
and commerce. For example, fishermen in Kerala, India, use their mobile phones to 
check the daily price of fish, ensuring that they land their catch at the most profitable 
quayside market. These simple uses of mobile phones create a high economic impact 
on individual producers by eliminating intermediaries. Many tradespeople have 
doubled their income by simply using a mobile phone, through which their services 
can be requisitioned directly by consumers.23
22 Camps were organized in Saarot, Taal, Kushalpura, and Barar panchayats of Rajsamand District, 
Rajasthan, on 27 December 2012.
23 See a film on How Mobiles are Helping Farmers and Fishermen, exclusive Telecom TV Re-
port from Kenya and India filmed on 13 March 2009 as part of the Mobile Planet Project, in 
partnership with the GSMA. Available at http://web20.telecomtv.com/comspace_videoDetail 
.aspx?v=3261&id=e9381817-0593-417a-8639-c4c53e2a2a10
In an internet-based initiative called e-Choupal, started in 2000 by ITC, a large 
Indian agribusiness private firm, farmers are being empowered by sharing price 
information and improving the handling of procured food grains (Kumar 2004). Often, 
farmers are exploited by intermediaries due to lack of information on prevailing prices 
for their produce. The ITC has set up 6,500 e-Choupals across eight states of India to 
procure 13 commodities, including oilseeds, grains, and coffee.24 Farmers visit the 
e-Choupals located in a nearby village and operated by one of the local farmers on 
behalf of ITC. They can obtain information on weather, prices in agricultural markets, 
and expert advice on agricultural practices free of cost. By bringing a sample of their 
produce to e-Choupal, they can also find out the price that ITC will offer. If ITC offers 
a competitive price for their produce, they can choose to sell their produce to ITC 
instead of the government-controlled mandis (large markets for agricultural produce). 
Over time, ITC has developed a loyal set of farmers who sell their produce to ITC and 
earn higher incomes through competitive prices, transparent procurement process, 
and lower logistic costs. They have increased yields, improved quality of produce, and 
reduced their transaction costs.
Over time, these farmers have converted into customers of ITC-produced 
consumer goods and agri-processed goods sold by large ITC shops adjoining the 
warehouses. The ITC further expanded its basket of services to include soil testing, 
tractor maintenance, and medical services. All these services are offered at a price 
that allows ITC to recover costs but does not include a profit margin. ITC then began 
to aggregate demand for other consumer goods and agricultural inputs and to supply 
such items at a competitive price and assured quality. It earned commissions from 
the suppliers of such goods and services. Currently, e-Choupal services reach more 
than 4 million farmers in about 40,000 villages.
24 See e-Choupal website at http://www.echoupal.com.
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Policy Lessons and Priorities
There are several policy messages that emerge from the review of empowerment and 
service delivery in this report. 
First, public services provide essential inputs for human and societal functioning, 
economic activity and human capital formation, and cash and in-kind transfers to 
redress economic inequality. Delivery of public services is important for not only 
improving individual well-being, but also promoting inclusive economic growth. 
Second, essential public services that protect the poor and vulnerable groups 
are the responsibility of governments. When markets do not exist or fail to work, public 
services will be under-provided by private providers who will have an incentive to free-
ride on the provision of others. Under such circumstances, the efficient delivery of 
public services requires involvement of the state.
Third, in much of developing Asia, even though significant progress has been 
made in recent years in improving the delivery of public services, the growth in 
public service provision has lagged behind the pace of economic growth. In addition, 
the quality of services is generally poor in many countries, resulting in a flight of 
consumers, even those with low incomes, to the private sector. 
Fourth, governments can improve the quantity and quality of public services by 
leveraging, or partnering with, the private and NGO sector in service delivery. However, 
in such cases, it is essential to match the contracted provider with the type of public 
service being contracted. It is also essential to design a compensation scheme to 
incentivize the non-state provider to provide high-quality services to the poor. Finally, 
government regulation of non-state providers is essential. 
Fifth, empowerment of the people can play a powerful role in improving the 
delivery of public services by making governments and private service providers 
accountable. There is considerable evidence from developing Asia to suggest that 
citizen and community empowerment mechanisms, such as citizen report cards, 
community score cards, social audits, grievance redress systems, and community 
participation in service delivery increase the accountability of service providers to 
citizens, thereby improving service delivery outcomes. 
Sixth, a common form of citizen and community empowerment is granting 
them the right to information and the right to specific services, but one of the biggest 
challenges in implementing the rights-based approach is the resource constraint that 
most countries in developing Asia face. A practical policy approach would be to make 
effective use of scarce public resources; enhance accountability in the delivery of 
elementary education, public health care, and other essential services; and expand 
the productivity of human beings to enable them to pay for some of their own welfare 
needs in the long run. 
Seventh, empowerment of the people can improve the quality of public services, 
but only if there are complementary changes in the workings of the state, including the 
bureaucracy, the political process, the judiciary, and the frontline service providers. 
Even though some Asian countries have improved their governance structures, 
there needs to be a systemic reform within the bureaucracy to create a genuinely 
transparent and accountable mode of governance.
Eighth, in the last two decades, ICT has taken root as a strong resource that can 
empower citizens by facilitating their participation in local governance, enabling fast 
access to information, giving them voice to demand transparency and accountability 
of government administration, and generally improving the efficiency of public and 
private service delivery. 
Ninth, e-delivery of services or useful content in most countries has lagged 
far behind the creation of infrastructure, while the demand for ICT-enabled services 
remains fragmented. Public–private–NGO partnerships are critical for promoting 
the spread of ICT. Social venture funds may be needed to attract private parties to 
develop ICT-enabled content for e-delivery of public services. 
Finally, a major problem in analyzing the quality of public services in developing 
Asia and the Pacific is that very few countries have a system of routine data collection 
on the quality of services. The only data available are from ad hoc (and often 
unrepresentative) surveys of schools and health facilities as well as satisfaction 
surveys of users of public services (both businesses and individuals). Governments in 
the region need to begin collecting data on the provision and quality of public services 
on a regular and consistent basis. A good start would be an agreement on a common 
set of indicators of service provision and service quality in different sectors.
To sum up, empowering people creates a virtuous cycle for economic 
development. Better access to public services improves living standards. It bolsters 
human capital, thus empowering people further. As the clients of public services, 
empowered citizens can in turn increase pressure for better governance and 
regulatory reform. This creates an enabling environment for private sector provision 
of some public services, freeing up scarce public resources for other developmental 
priorities. Information and communication technology can facilitate, expedite, and 
enhance the quality of this process. Citizen empowerment thus holds the key for a 
win-win development agenda in developing Asia. 
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Appendix
Selected ADB Projects for Improving Public Service Delivery – Illustrative 
Examples (2008–2013)
Project Name Description and Results
Improved Maternal and Child Health 
through Connectivity
• Tajikistan/Central Asia 
• Health/Transport 
• Approved: 7 Mar 2013
The primary objective of the project is to improve maternal and 
child health results for isolated rural communities Rasht district, 
one of Tajikistan’s poorest regions with the highest rates of food 
insecurity. The project will support (i) rehabilitation of the bridge 
and improvement of the rural road, which is linked to Central 
Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) corridors 3 and 5; 
and (ii) increased use of effective health services and nutrition 
practices in communities. 
Establishing a Regulatory Framework for 
Urban Water Supply and Sanitation
• Bangladesh/South Asia 
• Water and Infrastructure 
• Approved: 28 Jan 2013
The objective is to assist the government in developing rules 
and standards for regulating urban water utilities, and start 
performance monitoring of major water utilities. Expected 
outputs include (i) drafting rules and standards for regulating 
water utilities, including financial management regulations, 
tariff setting methodology, service standards and performance 
indicators, and customer service regulations; (ii) preparing 
monitoring reports on the performance of major water utilities 
by using the approved rules and standards; (iii) preparation and 
a road map for establishment of a Water Economic Regulatory 
Commission; and (iv) capacity building of the government officers 
to perform obligations.
Broadband for Development Project
• Solomon Islands/The Pacific 
• Transport and Information and 
Communication 
Technology (ICT) 
• Approved: 25 Sep 2012
The project supports the development and operation of a 
submarine fiber optic communication cable system (SCS), 
linking Solomon Islands to an existing international submarine 
cable network that runs between Guam and Sydney. The SCS 
will provide onward cost-effective broadband access to the rest 
of the world, which will boost opportunities to set the country 
on an inclusive growth path through the expansion of business 
opportunities in the ICT sector and the introduction of broadband 
solutions to service delivery constraints in key social sectors like 
health and education.
Ulaanbaatar Urban Services and Ger Areas 
Development Investment Program
• Mongolia/East Asia 
• Multisector 
• Approved: 13 Dec 2011
The investment program aims to promote an inclusive peri-urban 
development in Ulaanbaatar City’s ger areas. The program covers 
(i) urban governance, livelihood and socioeconomic activities, 
land use planning, and financial services; (ii) water supply, 
wastewater collection, and district heating infrastructures; 
and (iii) capacity building for sound institutional and regulatory 
settings for service delivery. Achievements are focused on 
improved urban planning system and subcenter development, 
expanded basic urban services, more efficient service providers, 
and improved corporate governance.
Reducing Child Malnutrition through Social 
Protection
• Nepal/South Asia 
• Health and Social Protection 
• Approved: 28 Feb 2011
The objective of the project is to create government capacity to 
plan and execute social protection programs and projects for 
more inclusive and equitable social outcomes. It is expected to 
reduce child malnutrition in project districts. Initial results show 
enhanced capacity of local bodies in the project districts to 
deliver the child grant; enhanced capacity of the government to 
design efficient and evidence-based social protection programs; 
enhanced networking between local bodies, health facilities, and 
communities in the project districts for improving child nutrition. 
A total of 1,169 female community health volunteers and 436 
health facility staff were trained under the project.
62  |  Empowerment and Public Service Delivery in Developing Asia and the Pacific
Public–Private Partnership (PPP) 
Development in Mongolia
• Mongolia/East Asia 
• Multisector 
• Approved: 17 August 2010
The project envisions improved efficiency and effectiveness of 
infrastructure service delivery. Success in the achievement 
of this impact is demonstrated by a material improvement in 
infrastructure efficiency and effectiveness indicators between 
2010 and 2014. Project outputs include the establishment of 
a modern, transparent institutional framework for PPPs which 
supports private sector engagement. 
Strengthening Technical Vocational 
Education and Training (TVET) Project
• Lao PDR/Southeast Asia 
• Education 
• Approved: 9 Jul 2010
The project outcome is an accessible formal vocational training 
system that is more responsive to labor market needs. The 
project has demonstrated successes in (i) improving the quality 
of TVET, (ii) widening equitable access to TVET, and (iii) fostering 
private sector involvement in TVET strategy and delivery. The 
initial report of accomplishments includes the development of 
curricula for 17 jobs.
Janub Gas-Fired Power Plant Project
• Azerbaijan/Central Asia 
• Energy
• Approved: 22 Jun 2010
The project aims to strengthen infrastructure development, 
remove inefficiencies in power generation and improve the 
efficiency of services. Two of its major successes are (i) 
construction of 780 megawatt combined cycle power plant and 
auxiliary facilities, sufficient and reliable for household and 
industrial needs, and (ii) successful return of AzerEnergy to the 
international commercial bank debt market.
Strengthening the Philippine Government 
Electronic Procurement System (PhilGEPS)
• Philippines/Southeast Asia 
• Public Sector Management (e-governance)
• Approved: 6 Mar 2009
PhilGEPS has improved transparency and efficiency of 
government procurement across all government departments. It 
has been reported that the government has saved over P564 
million in procurement-related advertising costs. Likewise, it is 
achieving better prices and substantial savings in administrative 
procurement costs and time. Suppliers find PhilGEPS to be a cost-
effective and efficient way of doing business with government. It 
is also providing greater opportunity for small and medium-sized 
enterprise participation.
Water Supply and Environmental 
Improvement in Madhya Pradesh Project 
(Supplementary Loan)
• India/South Asia 
• Water and Infrastructure Urban 
• Approved: 13 Oct 2008
Four municipal corporations have significantly reduced 
vulnerability of people to environmental degradation, poverty, 
and natural hazards, and increased economic opportunities. 
The project has recorded huge numbers of beneficiaries in three 
areas of public service delivery: (i) 5.30 million people for water 
supply, (ii) 0.50 million people for sewerage, and (iii) 4.70 million 
people for solid waste management.
Food Stamp Program
• Mongolia/East Asia 
• Health and Social Protection 
• Approved: 17 Dec 2008
Mongolia experienced very high food prices in 2008. It was 
important to cushion the vulnerability of the poor to this shock 
and reduce the impact of food insecurity. About 1.7 million people 
were surveyed and classified from poorest to less vulnerable. 
The poorest 5% received food stamps, each amounting to 
MNT10,000 per month for adults and MNT5,000 per month for 
children.
Source: Asian Development Bank. Projects Database. Available at http://www.adb.org/projects 
(accessed 10 April 2013).
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Empowerment and Public Service Delivery in Developing Asia and the Pacific
Viewed as a key to strengthening accountability, citizen empowerment alone is not enough 
to guarantee quality public service. It must go hand in hand with better governance. This 
report highlights two factors that have improved governance and public service provision 
in developing Asia: (i) citizen participation and monitoring of service providers, and 
(ii) the use of information and communication technology (ICT) to streamline bureaucratic 
processes, widen access to information, and embolden people’s voice. Participation and 
ICT hold great promises for the future, and yet require increasing public sector role as a 
facilitator—not so much as a provider—in public service delivery chain. 
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